THE COLONIZATION OF THE WOMB
NANCY EHRENREICHt
[M]otherhood has always been, and continues to be, a colonized

concept-an event physically practiced and experienced by women, but occupied and defined, given content and value, by the
core concepts of patriarchal ideology.'

Some problems we share as women, some we do not. You fear
your children will grow up to join the patriarchy and testify
against you, we fear our children will be dragged from a car and
shot down in the street, and you will turn your backs upon the
reasons they are dying.2
INTRODUCTION

When a friend of mine, whom I will call Jessica Norton, became pregnant, I was struck by the attitude she seemed to have
towards her obstetrician. I remember in particular her explanation
for why she had attended a conference in another city late in her
pregnancy. "The doctor gave me permission to fly," she said, "so I
went." Years later, I came across a very different account of a
woman's attitude towards the physician who delivered her child.
This woman was Kimberly Hardy, who was prosecuted for delivery
of drugs to a minor after she freely admitted that she had smoked
crack shortly before giving birth. "If I'd known things would have
turned out this way," she said, "I would have taken the easier,
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softer way out and not told anybody. What woman wouldn't be
afraid to tell her
doctor if she had the threat of prosecution hang3
her?",
over
ing
Jessica Norton and Kimberly Hardy had little in common
when they made these statements. One was a 32-year-old, uppermiddle-class academic having her first child, the other, a 23-yearold, unemployed mother of three. One is European-American, the
other, African-American. One hired a private physician to supervise her pregnancy and help deliver her baby, the other had limited prenatal care and went to the local county hospital for the
birth.4 One was married when she had her child, the other was
not married at the time of the birth.' The two women's statements also expressed markedly different attitudes about childbirth
and the physician-patient relationship.
For Jessica Norton, the physician is an expert, someone who
can provide information to her about how to manage her pregnancy. She did not hesitate to defer to his6 judgment during her pregnancy, willingly ceding to him the quasi-parental power to grant
her "permission" to engage in various activities. She seems not to
perceive obedience to his authority as either threatening or demeaning; rather, she treats it as a natural response to his knowledge. The trust implicit in her statement is profound: she is certain
that the doctor told her what was best for herself and the fetus
she was carrying, and she experiences her following of his advice
as free and willing. The possibility of conflict between them, of his
authority standing as a threat to her autonomy, is completely ab-

3. Isabel Wilkerson, Woman Cleared After Drug Use in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES,
April 3, 1991, at A15; see also Court Dismisses Prosecution for Drug Use During Preg-

nancy, 3 ACLU REPROD. RTS. UPiATE, April 5, 1991, at 3. Another woman had a
similar reaction: "I'm a perfect example of someone who tried to reach out, and it's all

coming back in my face ....

Everyone I talked to about my drug problem has been

subpoenaed." Jan Hoffman, Pregnant Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1990,

§ 6 (Magazine), at 34, 55 (quoting Lynn Bremer, who was also prosecuted for having
used cocaine during her pregnancy).
4. See Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and
the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 741 (1991).

5. Id. at 741 n.9; see Hoffman, supra note 3, at 34 (recounting the difficult relations
between Ms. Hardy and the father of her child).
6. Throughout this Article, I will use the male pronoun in referring to physicians

and the female pronoun in referring to patients. I do so not because I am unaware of
the fact that there are female physicians but rather to emphasize the gender components
that most commonly characterize the doctor-patient dyad in the types of situations I will
be analyzing.
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sent from her vision-as is the mechanism by which medical judgments are enforced against patients, the law.7
In contrast, Kimberly Hardy's statement is explicitly about
power and how to avoid its coercive exercise. Having seen her
own visit to a hospital for birthing assistance result in drug testing,
notification of the authorities, and the removal of her child, she no
longer has any trust in medical practitioners. Given her doctors'
role in triggering her criminal prosecution, it is no doubt far from
clear to her that they have either her interests or those of her
child 8 at heart. To her, physicians represent the punitive power of
the state, the arm of the law clearly visible behind their white
coats.
Both of these women are oppressed, but in very different
ways. Jessica Norton's implicit trust in medical professionals which,
in all likelihood, permeates her entire approach to pregnancy and
labor, makes her vulnerable to the biases and value preferences of
modem medicine.9 Passively accepting her physician's conclusions
about what is best for her, she might forego alternative treatments
that would more closely comport with her lifestyle, family needs,

7. My point here is not that Jessica Norton's vision of her relationship with her
physician is necessarily accurate; in fact, I will be suggesting that women like her are
often unaware of significant medical facts and relational dynamics affecting their situations. Her perception of the doctor-patient relationship as devoid of direct physical coercion and explicit signs of disrespect, however, is probably fairly true to her experience
and the experiences of those like her. The power dynamics in her relationship with her
physician are much more subtle and less overtly violent than the power dynamics
Kimberly Hardy experienced. See infra text accompanying notes 305-09.
8. When women like Ms. Hardy are arrested for their behavior, their children frequently end up either in a destructive cycle of foster care or, more recently, as "boarder
babies," warehoused in hospitals when the foster system has no place to put them. See
J.C. Barden, Hospitals Housing Healthy Infants, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, at A20.
9. In exploring the existence and effect of biases in medicine throughout this Article, I mean to indict a system, not the individuals in it.
The medical staff, on one hand, are involved in a difficult situation. They know
they should care for these women; they know that their machines are fallible;
they sometimes disagree with each other, and they feel threatened by malpractice suits. On the other hand, if we look not at the bind of individual practitioners but at what they do and the circumstances in which they do it-the collective rather than the individual situation-we see a different context with different constraints ....
Medical workers ... control the setting, they determine
the right way to give birth.
Susan Irwin & Brigitte Jordan, Knowledge, Practice, and Power: Court-Ordered Cesarean
Sections, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 319, 331 (1987). Moreover, in exploring the hierarchical relationships between white male doctors and various female patients, I do not
mean to suggest that these are the only doctor-patient relationships characterized by hierarchy. See infra note 120.

1993]

COLONIZATION OF THE WOMB

495

health concerns, and/or level of risk averseness. Moreover, by
ceding to him all control over her reproductive processes, she
disempowers herself in a way likely to be deeply destructive of her
sense of self.'? Although her own attitudes create these risks, she
does not realize that there is an alternative way to think about her
situation. The lives and labors of thousands of women before her,
as well as the statements of thousands of health professionals and
the holdings of numerous legal cases, have created for her an
image of reality that makes her approach to reproductive activity
seem not so much preferable to other approaches as natural and
inevitable.
Kimberly Hardy's oppression is, of course, easier to see. Hers
is not the oppression of "false consciousness," an inability to recognize the subtle but powerful ways in which her autonomy is
constrained and her alternatives limited. For she has experienced a
much more direct and violent (if you will)" intervention into her
decisionmaking-an intervention engineered by people likely to be
thrice, rather than once, removed from her (that is, removed by
gender, race, and class, not just gender). Ms. Hardy is only too
aware of the threat that the medicolegal system poses to her autonomy; for2her, the problem is not recognizing her oppression but
escaping it.'
The purpose of this Article is to explore the different ways in
which the medical and legal professions approach and treat the reproductive activity engaged in by the two groups to which Jessica
Norton and Kimberly Hardy belong-relatively high-income, European-American women (whom I will call "privileged women") and
low-income women of color or white women (whom I will call
"outsider women"). 3 Focusing on instances of forced medical

10. See ADRmNNE RICH, OF WOMAN BoRN 176 (1976).
11. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE U. 1601 (1986) (arguing
that legal decisions themselves constitute a form of violence).
12. Of course, Ms. Hardy actually might not have recognized the potential for coercion in her relationship with her physician until after he reacted to her in a coercive
manner. For a discussion of whether and to what extent different types of women unquestioningly accept medical authority, rather than reject it, see infra Part 1H.
13. My assumption will be that low-income white women tend to be treated as outsider women and that middle- or upper-class women of color tend to be treated as privileged women (assuming, in both instances, that their class status is accurately perceived).
In saying "tend to," I mean to emphasize that differences of treatment based solely on
race probably exist as well. On the importance of perceptions of class status in determining how women are treated, see Anna L. Tsing, Monster Stories: Women Charged with
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treatment during pregnancy (especially Cesarean sections),1 4 I will

Perinatal Endangerment, in UNCERTAIN TERMs 282, 294 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna L.
Tsing eds., 1990).
I have chosen to focus my analysis on the notion of outsiders, although I recognize
that there are problems with lumping all racial and ethnic minorities together into one
category. There are clearly vast differences among the cultures of various racial or ethnic
groups. Moreover, different stereotypes are applied to different groups as well. Nevertheless, it is also true that the racial stereotypes that exist in this country are often very
totalizing, reducing many ethnic minorities to one type. (This seems to me to be particularly true of stereotypes that apply to African-American and Latino groups, on the one
hand, aifd Asians and Asian-Americans, on the other.) In addition, some of the data on
mainstream attitudes on which I will rely do not break things down by specific groups.
Se eg., Fineman, supra note 1, at 275 (describing how Americans tend to assume that
all poor women are women of color). For these reasons, the outsider women category is
perhaps-at least at present-a necessary evil. Nevertheless, I will indicate when I am
relying on information that is about only one group of women. Furthermore, my use of
the outsider category will be limited to employing it to describe mainstream attitudes
towards such women and will not extend to using it to describe the varied attitudes of
the different groups of women themselves.
Of course, by focusing on class, race, and gender, I am inevitably leaving out other
categories of difference and differential treatment, such as sexual orientation. For a discussion of the problems of exclusion in feminist analyses, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). For a
radically different and powerfully insightful take on questions of sameness and difference,
see JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 1-6 (1990) (arguing that rather than worry
about whether all women share anything in common, we should instead ask what political
interests are served by the construction of our differences).
14. A national survey of court-ordered obstetrical procedures recently conducted revealed that of 15 court orders for Cesarean sections that had been sought in 11 states,
14 were obtained. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions,
316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987). In all, 21 cases seeking court-ordered obstetrical treatment were identified, id. at 1192, and since the study was based on hospital selfreports, these figures may be low. Moreover, there is some indication that doctors may
be performing C-sections on women without obtaining either consent or a court order.
Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 332 n.15; Ronna Jurow & Richard H. Paul, Cesarean
Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal Consent, 63 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
596, 596-98 (1984) (reporting that such unauthorized surgeries occur).
Probably due to the fact that the birth of the child renders any subsequent appeal
moot, there are very few reported cases of court-ordered Cesareans. I have identified
only three: In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); In re Madyun Fetus, 114
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986); and Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). For discussions of unreported cases, see
Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 321-25; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery
Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1951 n.4
(1986).
The Kolder article also reported that of the 57 heads of fellowship programs in
maternal-fetal medicine who responded to the survey, 46% "thought that mothers who
refused medical advice and thereby endangered the life of the fetus should be detained
in hospitals or other facilities so that compliance could be ensured," and 26% "advocated
state surveillance of women in the third trimester who stay outside the hospital system."
Kolder et al., supra, at 1193-94. The authors of the report concluded from their data
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argue that conventional doctrinal explanations of the results in
these cases are inadequate. It is impossible to fully understand
why courts have been willing to coercively intervene in certain
women's reproductive lives without understanding such cases as
power struggles-struggles over the control of reproduction and
the meaning of motherhood.
In the Cesarean context, conventional analyses have been
concerned primarily with whether the woman has freely chosen to
birth vaginally and whether there is any justification for overriding
that choice." As long as she has formally consented to Cesarean
surgery, the case is assumed to be an easy one: her decision
should be effectuated. When she has refused, however, the question becomes whether the state can override that choice. Conventional legal analyses thus pose questions such as: 1) Does the right
to decide whether to procreate necessarily imply a right to decide
how to procreate?; 2) Does the state's interest in the life and
health of an full-term fetus outweigh the woman's right to refuse
medical treatment?; 3) Does the duty of a parent to rescue a child
in danger extend to a mother carrying a full-term fetus? Does it
apply
even when the rescue involves a risk of death to the moth16
er?
These doctrinal approaches are not unimportant, of course, in
that they certainly influence judges' articulated analyses and hence
the popular understanding and impact of such cases. I would suggest, however, that when proffered as explanations for judicial outcomes, they miss as much as they see. As Lisa Ikemoto has argued, the rights-based analysis employed in such works obscures
the devaluation of women's interests that occurs before those inter-

that "court-ordered obstetrical procedures represent an important and growing problem."

Id.at 1192.
15. The legal literature on court-ordered treatment during pregnancy is voluminous.
See, e.g., Janean A. Daniels, Court-Ordered Cesareans: A Growing Concern for Indigent
Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1064 (1988); Joel J. Finer, Toward Guidelines for
Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights, Responsibility, and Decisional Authenticity, 76

MINN. L. REv. 239 (1991); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and
Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487

(1992); Kenneth Jost, Mother Versus Child, 75 A.B.A. J.,Apr. 1989, at 84; Rhoden, supra note 14; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
16. See e.g., Rhoden, supra note 14, at 1960-82 (discussing the relationship between
court-ordered treatment and abortion law, as well as child neglect, refusal of treatment,
and duty to rescue).
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ests are "balanced" against other interests.17 As such, this analysis
obscures the values and assumptions that underlie judicial outcomes.18 Moreover, doctrinally-focused inquiries fail to examine
the historical antecedents of modem coercive interventions in
pregnancy, particularly those directed against outsider women,19
and fail to explore the effect of race and class factors on the treatment women receive. Finally, in treating the choice to consent to a
C-section as an uncontroversial expression of individual autonomy,
conventional analyses ignore the extent to which such individual
choices are themselves intimately tied to the ideological structures
that judicial decisions help to create and sustain. Thus, only by
interrogating the ideological components of such decisions, paying
particular attention to the impact of race, class, and gender on the
results, can we develop a full understanding of how they occur and
which segments of society they affect.
In highlighting the importance of the effect of gender, race,
and class on women's situations, I am of course drawing on recent
scholarship by women of color that emphasizes the need for such
multidimensional analyses.' Until recently, gender, race, and class
17. See Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 498-99.
18. "The standard story assumes only one concept of the social good; it assumes the
truth of stereotypes of pregnant women, well-motivated doctors, and of rational, competent decisionmakers; and it assumes that only rights against the state need be defined."
Id. at 509.
19. Any study of coerced Cesarean sections must necessarily be placed against the
backdrop of a broad spectrum of coercive interventions in the reproductive lives of outsider women, especially women of color, that have occurred in the past and are continuing (if not intensifying) in the present. See infra subsection I(C)(1).
Although some people thought that forced C-sections would stop after the infamous
Angela Carder case, in which a woman dying of cancer was ordered to undergo a Cesarean although it might shorten her life, see In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated
and remanded, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), there is some evidence to suggest
that they are continuing, see, eg., Wisconsin Court Orders Caesarian Section, 2 ACLU
REPROD. RTs. UPDATE, Dec. 21, 1990, at 6 (reporting case in which Wisconsin circuit
judge ordered forced Cesarean); cf. Hospital Transfers Pregnant Woman Against Her Will,
2 ACLU REPROD. RTS. UPDATE, Feb. 16, 1990, at 7 (reporting case in which circuit
court judge in Baltimore ordered a woman with pre-term labor pains to be transferred to
different hospital over her objection that she wanted to be able to go home to care for
her 19-month-old son); see also supra note 14 (listing data on physicians' attitudes toward
women who act contrary to medical advice).
20. In legal scholarship, following the usage introduced by Kimberl6 Crenshaw, such
multidimensional analyses tend to be called analyses of "intersectionality." Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex A Black Feminist Critique of
AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, 141 (1989). The following list provides a mere sampling of the mushrooming body
of legal and -non-legal work focusing on the effect of both race and gender on women of
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were understood as distinct and monolithic systems of oppression
and thus were separately studied and analyzed. In legal
scholarship, for example, white feminists spent much of their time
challenging the male perspective lurking behind supposedly "objective" legal doctrines and arguing against the notion that male
viewpoints and situations represented universal understandings and
conditions. 2 ' While this was crucial and groundbreaking work, in
attempting to show that women and men were situated differently,
and differently affected by the law, some theorists also unfortunately neglected to consider whether their view of "women" was
as flawed as the essentialized' view of "people" that they were
attacking. In thus assuming that gender had a single meaning, they
conflated the experience of low-income white women and women
of color with those of high-income white women, with the result
that the effect of the law on the former was either not fully appreciated or rendered invisible altogether. Assuming that the effects
of race and class on legal thinking could be left to race-focused
and class-focused analyses, they failed to see the need to address
those effects in their gender-based inquiries.
Although such unidimensional types of analysis still dominate
legal and societal discourse today, their viability has been put into
question by a number of recent efforts to combine race, gender,
and (sometimes) class inquiries within one analysis.' Not surpris-

color. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990); ANGELA Y. DAVIS,
WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1981); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN (1981); PATRICIA
J. WILLIAm, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L. 191

(1991); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539 (1989); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Mari

Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419 (1991); Deborah J. Krauss, Note, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of
Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L L
REV. 523 (1991).
21. See, eg., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989);

CATHARINE A.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES

ON

LIE AND LAW (1987).

22. By an "essentialized view," I mean a view that assumes that a group has a fixed,
unchanging essence (whether as part of its inherent nature, as the term is more frequently used, or as a product of culture) and that therefore all members of the group are
essentially alike.
23. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 20, at 590-601 (criticizing the work of Catharine
MacKinnon); cf., e.g., COLLINS, supra note 20 (analyzing race and gender); DAVIS, supra
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ingly, the work of women scholars of color has been central to this
effort. Highlighting the contradictions that "additive" ' treatments
of race and gender pose for women of color, these authors have
argued that an approach that ignores the interrelationship between
race and gender inevitably sacrifices the interests of the most
marginalized individuals. That is, because race-based analyses focus
on men of color and gender-based analyses focus on white women,
women of color fall through the analytical cracks.' Thus, critics
of the reform efforts and theories of the white feminist movement
have argued that much of that movement's efforts simply do not
address the needs or concerns of women of color.' Moreover,

they suggest, an unwillingness to give up race privilege is part of
what prevents white women from broadening their gender analyses
to include those more marginalized than themselves.'
The value of these insights is particularly apparent in the
Cesarean section context. The scholarly literature on forced Csections conveys the impression that doctors, elevating the interests
of the fetus over those of the mother and nervous about malprac-

tice liability, seek to force surgery on women in order to guaran-

note 20 (same); NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1983) (analyzing class and gender); CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCALIST FEMINISM (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979) [hereinafter SOCIALIST FEMtINSM] (same).
24. Elizabeth Spelman has used the term "additive" to describe approaches to gender
and race that assume (for example) that, one can adequately describe the situation of
women of color by describing the separate effects of both racism and sexism-that is, by
adding together the distinct impacts of gender and race subordination. SPELMAN, supra
note 13, at 114-32.
25. The intersectional analysis of race and gender that has been developed by
KimberlI Crenshaw and others constitutes a rejection of the "additive" approach.
Intersectional analysis emphasizes that mixing race and gender is not like mixing blue
and yellow balls, but rather like mixing blue and yellow paint. The resulting form of
oppression completely transcends and transforms the two independent forms of subordination, just as the color green is something entirely different from blue or yellow. In short,
intersectionality analysis rejects the additive notion that one can understand the situation
of women of color by merely combining what one knows about the situation of men of
color with what one knows about the situation of white women. Crenshaw, supra note
20, at 140. Moreover, implicit within this critique (but not always explicitly stated) is the
notion that just as we cannot understand the situation of women of color without understanding the combined effect of their race, class, and gender, so we cannot truly understand the situation of white women without similarly exploring the impact of their own
race and class status on their lives. For an early articulation of these insights, see BELL
HOOKS, FEMimIST THEORY (1984).
26. See, e.g., HOOKS, supra note 20, at 119-59; Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 152-60.
27. Se4 eg., Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 154.
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tee a problem-free birth and that judges, lacking the time to hear
fully developed testimony on the need for intervention, defer to
the doctors.' While this image is not incorrect, it is incomplete.
The pattern of behaviors it identifies could occur during any
woman's labor, and yet the vast majority of court-ordered C-sections have involved poor women of color.29 Without noticing and
explaining the differential impact of coercive interventions on these
women, prevailing explanations of the problem ignore the extent
to which race and class prejudice, combined with gender bias, facilitate such treatment. Recognition of these attitudinal components
raises the possibility that, in turn, it is due to race and class privilege that high-income white women are spared such interventions.
Women scholars of color themselves have emphasized that it
is essential to recognize privileged women's unwitting complicity in
the subordination of outsider women."0 These authors have argued (correctly, I believe) that only by seeing the benefits that
accrue to them because of their race and class position will privileged women become willing and able to advocate reforms that
will benefit all women, rather than just themselves. The thrust of
the message is that privileged women will have to give up something-their own economically and racially privileged status-in
order to get something-true equality for all women.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with this analysis, as far as
it goes. The blindness of white feminists to race and class issues is
certainly widespread and harmful.3" Moreover, there are very concrete ways in which the comfort such women enjoy is directly facilitated by the subjugation of women of color.3 2 But focusing
28. Much of the discussion in the literature has emphasized the lack of time to make
informed judgments about what interventions are necessary and the overuse of C-sections
by modem American medicine. See; eg., Rhoden, supra note 14, at 2029-30. In citing
Rhoden's article here, however, I do not mean to derogate its importance in drawing
much-needed attention to forced C-section cases and offering many important doctrinal
and policy arguments against such forced surgery.
29. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
30. "Feminists thus ignore how their own race functions to mitigate some aspects of
sexism and, moreover, how it often privileges them over and contributes to the domination of other women." Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 154.
31. I do not mean necessarily to imply here that I, as a high-income white feminist,
am somehow immune from this indictment. I only hope that, as I continue reading, talking, and thinking about these matters, it will become less and less applicable to me.
32. Employing outsider women in low-paying jobs cleaning the homes of privileged
women so that the latter will have time to attend to their high-paying jobs is one of the
examples commonly cited.
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only on the advantages provided to high-incbme white women by
their race and class poses problems of its own. First, it leads to
the conclusion that the interests of privileged and outsider women
are in conflict and that it is therefore impossible to better the lot
of both together. Although, at one level, that insight is undeniably
true-if outsider women are protected from low-paying and demeaning housecleaning jobs, for example, privileged women will
have to clean their own homes-at another level, it ignores fundamental connections between women's situations. Privileged women
are not only advantaged by their privileged status but also are
disadvantaged.
In short, taking seriously the injunction of female writers of
color that gender cannot be understood separate and apart from
race (and class) requires us to be as careful to avoid "additive"
analysis in our consideration of high-income white women's situations as in our consideration of the situations of low-income women of color. Implicit within the critique of "additive" approaches is
the notion that, just as we cannot understand the situation of
women of color without understanding the combined effect of
their race, class, and gender, so we cannot truly understand the
situation of white women without similarly exploring the impact of
their own race and class, with gender, on their lives.
We cannot assume, for example, that since white women are
members of the dominant race (and sometimes the dominant
class), we will adequately understand the oppression they suffer by
describing only how they are disadvantaged by their gender. Such
an approach is itself "additive" in that it assumes that one can
understand the situation of high-income white women by adding
race privilege onto gender disadvantage. This assumption fails to
appreciate that the white woman's situation is necessarily the
product of the interaction among her race, class, and gender, just
as the woman of color's situation is. In other words, to assume
that having dominant class and race status provides nothing but
advantages to high-income white women is to conflate their situation with that of high-income white men. It is to fail to recognize
that race, class, and gender interact in complex and dialectical
ways, not only when an individual is on the side of the dominated
in each of those categories, but also when she is identified with
both domination and oppression. In short, the approach that I am
suggesting raises the possibility that it is not necessarily accurate to
describe Jessica Norton's situation by saying that, despite her race
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and class privilege, she suffers gender bias. Instead, it may be
more profitable to consider that it is by virtue of her privileged
position in society-not despite it-that she is subordinated to the
patriarchal power of her physician. In this respect, as I will argue
later, judicial enforcement of doctors' orders against outsider women, by reinforcing medicine's cultural authority in society generally,
indirectly contributes to the subordination of privileged women as
well.
The theoretical advances feminists of color have provided
should be extended not only by applying them to the analysis of
all women but also by examining how race, class, and gender
interact at the systemic, as well as the individual, level. An approach that examines the combined effect of race, class, and gender on the individuals who find themselves at the intersection of
two or more particular hierarchical structures captures only one
dimension of the complex relationships among these overlapping
systems of oppression. I wish to explore in more detail the mutually reinforcing impact of those systems by examining the complex
interaction between race, class, and gender ideology that informs
and legitimates both medical and legal decisionmaking in the reproductive area.33 Focusing on that interaction draws attention
not only to the ways' in which the experiences of women like
Jessica Norton and Kimberly Hardy are different but also to the
ways in which those experiences are related. Both of their situations, I will argue, stem from a complex web of mutually reinforcing hierarchies that operates simultaneously to support and to hide
the oppressive (although different) conditions in which the two
women exist.? Thus, only when they recognize that their destinies
are inevitably linked will both groups of women have any chance
of changing their futures. 35
33. In this respect, although the substantive analysis I present here owes much to the
"intersectionality" scholarship just described, my methodology also has affinities with the
work of nonlegal socialist feminist scholars. See, e.g., HARTSOCK, supra note 23; SOCIALIST FEMINISM, supra note 23.
34. I do believe it is important to point out that efforts to address race hierarchy
may often be in tension with efforts to address gender hierarchy, and vice versa. See,
e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 157-60 (describing how attacks on the racism that motivated (and motivates) rape prosecutions fail to address the gender violence of rape,
whereas efforts to attack the institutionalized violence against women that rape represents
fail to address the racism that affects the processing and outcome of many rape
prosecutions). My concern here, however, is instead to emphasize the connections between those hierarchies.
35. I am aware that this last point could sound like an assertion that self-interest is
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In addition, this Article examines the crucial role played by
physicians in the development of negative images of outsider women. By identifying at-risk fetuses, physicians also identify "irresponsible" mothers-women who "should" have C-sections but refuse.
In thus labelling such women, physicians legitimize coercive interventions and stigmatize those subjected to them. Moreover, since
medical testimony usually serves as the sole basis upon which
judicial decisions in this area are rendered, it is the unquestioned
legitimacy of the medical profession's assessments of such situations that obscures the race/gender dynamics that underlie them.
Thus, this Article also will address the relationship between law
and medicine, as systems of social control and as systems of
thought. For just as it is impossible to discuss forced C-sections
without discussing race, so it is also impossible to discuss legal
decisions in this area without discussing medicine, and law's relationship to-it.
After all, revealed in Jessica Norton's and Kimberly Hardy's.
statements (as I have suggested) is not only a different view of
medicine but also a different experience of it. And such differential
experiences are not particular to these two individuals but endemic
to modem medicine's treatment of the groups to which they belong. Women of color are often treated differently by physicians
than are white women; the poor (a disproportionate number of
whom are minorities 6) tend to receive very different medical care
than the well-off.3 7 Such inequities in the health care system are
certainly problematic for a system of law that traditionally gives
extreme deference to medical expertise and judgments, especially
in this area. The possibility that those judgments themselves reprethe best or only reason for white women to take an interest in the perspectives of women of color. I emphatically do not wish to say that. Oppression should be battled for its
own sake, not for any ulterior motives. Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that the only
way, inpractical terms, to dislodge the small elite currently exercising power in this society is to create an awareness among the various disempowered groups of the interlocking
nature of their situations. The creation of that awareness is a complex process, involving
first a recognition of difference and then an appreciation of the interlocking nature of
different groups' conditions. Hopefully, this Article will be a useful contribution to that
process. See Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 516 ("[P]atriarchy . . . not only blinds and silences us. It also separates us.").
36. Although minorities make up only 16% of the total population, 33.5% of all
persons below the poverty line in 1991 were minorities. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991 SERIES P-60, No. 181
(1992).
37. See infra subsection I(C)(2).
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sent something other than "pure" science-that is, that they might
be adulterated by race, class, or gender bias or by value judgments
of any kind-raises problems for a supposedly neutral system of
adjudication. Thus, I will argue here that law, 38 constantly seeking
to preserve its claims to objectivity and value-free decisionmaking,
simply cannot use medicine as its neutrality-providing foil.
In Part I, I describe a set of associations that is used to construct images of privileged and outsider women in the United
States. Using a forced C-section case as an illustration, I argue
that those associations justify and legitimate coercive control of the
sexual and reproductive lives of outsider women and subtler, less
overt control of the sexual and reproductive lives of privileged
women. I also discuss the role of medicine in legitimating such
control by reinforcing and reacting to those same sets of associations. I argue further in this Part that the unquestioned legitimacy
of modem medicine operates in this arena to obscure a conflict
between the pathologizing view of women and reproduction that
contemporary physicians hold and a competing vision of birthing
that the alternative birth movement has articulated. I use this
insight to suggest that, when viewed as skirmishes in a battle over
who should control reproductive activity, women's refusals of Cesarean sections can be seen, not as acts of stubborn selfishness, but
rather as acts of resistance to the dominant order. For all of these
reasons, the extreme deference awarded to medical opinion in such
cases is unwarranted.
In Part II, I offer some possible explanations for that deference. Exploring the ways in which law and medicine legitimate
each other by obscuring the social power each exerts through its
decisions, I argue that, in so doing, they simultaneously perpetuate
the subordination of both outsider and privileged women. In Part
III, I draw some conclusions about the implications of my analysis
for questions of how power operates in society, suggesting that the
power that medicine and law exert in this context is the power to
create women's bodies-to describe what happens within them, to
define which ones are normal and abnormal, to declare them dangerous or safe.

38. As the previous sentence suggests, by "law" I mean only judicial decisions, not
legislative enactments. The judicial system presents itself as neutral in the sense that
judges purport to base their decisions on legal principles and policy analysis, rather than
on their own ethical views or personal biases.
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DUALISTIC IMAGES AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

My mother used to say that the black woman is the white man's
mule and the white woman is his dog. Now, she said that to say
this: we do the heavy work and get beat whether we do it well
or not. But the white woman is closer to the master and he pats
them on the head and lets them sleep in the house, but he ain'
gon' treat neither one like he was dealing with a person.39
A.

Introduction: Dualisms in Western Thought

This Part discusses the ways in which ideological imagery
facilitates and legitimates the subordination of different types of
women. Describing a set of dualistic images that contrast outsider
and privileged women with each other and with (privileged) men,
I will argue that those images serve to justify differential and
subordinating treatment of these different groups of women. My
point is not that these dualisms actually produce differential
treatment, but rather that they legitimate it and obscure the exercise of social power that it represents. In short, it is the ability to
apply the dualistic labels, and to thereby invoke an entire set of
associations that go with them, that enables those with social power in society to believe, and to convince others, that the position
they enjoy and the power they wield are natural and just. That is,
the power to define others-to affect how they are perceived-is
the power to control them. Here, both physicians and judges wield
that power, through their role in identifying which side of each
dualism applies to which people.
As others have noted, in each of the dualistic pairs with which
Western thought is permeated, the contrasting terms that constitute the pair are seen as polar opposites and exist in hierarchical
relation, with one consistently being perceived as of greater value
than the other.' Reason is usually thought to be better than
emotion, neutrality better than bias, action better than passivity,
self-reliance better than dependency, culture better than the state
of nature, and so on. In addition, such dualisms are also often

39. JOHN L. GwALTNEY, DRYLONGSO: A SELF-PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA 148

(1980) (quoting interview of Nancy White, a 73-year-old black woman).
40. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law 1-3 (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
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"gendered," so that the devalued terms are consistently associated
with women and the valued ones with men.4
Less commonly acknowledged (in white scholarship), but
equally true, is that there are also "racialized" dualisms, in which
people of color are associated with the devalued side and whites
with the valued side. Of course, the exact terms used are not
always the same-race and sex inequality are not fungible
oppressions-but the dynamic is analogous. In both contexts, a set
of dualisms with hierarchical terms is used to elevate upper-class,
white, heterosexual men, as contrasted with some other group.4 2
Similarly, the poor are often thought to embody devalued traits
(perhaps partially because many of them are also people of color-or vice versa).4' Finally, it has been pointed out that law is
associated with the dominant term in many of the pairs. It is
thought to be rational, objective, neutral, and disinterested, rather
than emotional, narrow-minded, biased, or self-serving.'
Less discussed until recently are the ways in which the various
sets of associations within Western dualisms interact. Thus, as
previously noted, most legal scholarship addressing gender issues
and law treats "women" as a homogeneous category, assuming that
the material conditions of, dominant attitudes towards, and con-

41. Id. Olsen uses the term "sexualized," but "gendered" seems more appropriate
since "female" traits are at least sometimes expressed in hortatory terms (e.g., a "good"
or "real" woman acts in such a way), although not always (e.g., women "naturally" act
in such a way).
An infrequently noted limitation on the gendered nature of these dualisms is (as I
will argue in more detail later) that the women so stereotyped are only white, upperand middle-class women.
42. Thus, for example, white women are more likely to be stereotyped as weak and
men and women of color as lazy, both in opposition to the supposed strength and industry of white males. For a discussion of disparaging stereotypes of women of color, see
COLLINS, supra note 20, at 67-82. For a discussion of disparaging stereotypes of men of
color, see Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (citing sources). For a
discussion of disparaging stereotypes of white women, see Wendy W. Williams, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections On Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L.
REP. 175 (1982).
43. For a discussion of disparaging stereotypes of impoverished single mothers, see
Fimeman, supra note 1.
44. See Olsen, supra note 40, at 4-5. Actually, within certain legal contexts the
dualisms operate as well, so that judges are more likely to be associated with the dominant terms and juries are often seen as irrational, prejudiced, and mired in subjectivity.
Cf Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation, TIKKUN, July-Aug.
1987, at 31 (comparing images of the "intellectual" and the "mob").
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cerns and values of all women are the same.4 5 As a result, such
articles fail to explore, for example, how the elevation of whites
over blacks4" affects prevailing images of women of color, especially in contexts in which the category "woman" appears to be
the only relevant category. Put another way, when we are dealing
with cultural attitudes towards reproduction or mothering, activities
unique to women, gender categories alone are often assumed to be
sufficient to explain the cultural dynamics that occur. However,
race and class attitudes operate as well in these contexts, producing new sets of dualisms within the category "women." Especially
in the realms of sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood, the
dominant culture sees privileged women and outsider women differently, and these differing perceptions affect the experiences of
women of both groups.
Section I(B) will describe the dichotomous images of privileged women and outsider women, both as women and as mothers.
Of particular interest to me are not so much the images themselves, but rather the way in which they serve to legitimate male
control over the reproductive lives of both groups. As Nancy
White's quote above suggests (although in a different context),
that control is exercised in different ways against the two types of
women: outsider women tend to be subjected to open exercises of
coercion, whereas privileged women tend to be controlled instead
through force of habit.47 Thus, in Section I(C), I will argue that
this treatment is made possible (that is, it is seen as acceptable)
precisely because privileged women tend to be characterized as
"good" and outsider women as "bad."48 Moreover, as Section

45. The exception, of course, is the recent work of women of color. See supra note
20 (citing representative works). Moreover, even when white women acknowledge the
importance of race, they often do so only to state that it is beyond the scope of the
present article. In fact, it was, in part, my own determination not to drop another such
qualifying footnote, see Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177, 1228 n.187
(1990), that prompted me to undertake this effort. For a radical departure from approaches that universalize the category "woman," see BUTLER, supra note 13, at 6-7,
11-12 (arguing that not only gender but also sex is socially constructed).
46. Although I prefer to capitalize Black, as others have done, see, e.g., Crenshaw,
supra note 20, the convention of the Duke Law Journal is otherwise.
47. For the moment, I make this statement as a comparative, rather than an absolute, assertion; eventually, I will probe it further. See infra Section 111(A).
48. However, this does not mean that all individuals who fit my definition of outsider women are necessarily subjected to coercion or that all those who fit my definition of
privileged women are necessarily protected from it. Rather, those who have fallen from
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I(D) explains, in the medicolegal context, the differential treatment
of the two groups is legitimated not only by those stereotypes but
also by medicine's claimed objective and neutral image, which
validates physicians' assessments about who is good and who is
bad. That is, it is the legitimacy of modern medicine that supports
doctors' cultural authority to label women as good 'or bad. That
authority, in turn, induces courts to imbue medical labels with the
force of law. Thus, in both Section I(C) and Section I(D), I use
legal scholarship and a Cesarean section case to illustrate how law
both accepts and perpetuates the dominant visions of medicine,
mothers, and reproduction.
B. Dualistic Images of Women: Good and Bad Girls, Good and
Bad Mothers
Prevailing Western stereotypes of women have been articulated through pairs of contrasting images, the different sides of which
are associated with different types of women. For simplicity's sake,
in this Section I will merely describe those dualisms, before turning in subsequent Sections to the different, but related, ways in
which they have justified the differential treatment accorded to the
two groups of women.
As previously mentioned, when white feminist writers have
described Western stereotypes of women, they have often emphasized the current influence of the cult of domesticity and the "separate spheres" ideology of the nineteenth century."9 Under those

worldviews, the public sphere is the man's domain and the domestic sphere is the woman's. Women are associated with the home
and are thought to have those characteristics-nurturing, selflessness, emotionality, patience, asexuality--most suited to the routine daily tasks of home maintenance and childcare. An integral
part of this set of associations, of course, is the devaluation of the
domestic realm, so that all of these traits are seen as good for
grace in some way or another get labelled as bad girls and treated like outsider women.
The boundaries between the two groups are fluid and changing, but the majority of privileged women have not been so labelled, and as the majority of outsider women have not
had the opportunity to escape the bad girl status.
49. See, eg., Williams, supra note 42, at 190-200 (describing that ideology).
50. For a striking example of how sexuality is thought to be inconsistent with the
maternal role, see Ellen Goodman, Pregnant Moore's Photo Lays Bare a- Visual Taboo,

ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 20, 1991, at A19 (discussing reactions to nude picture of
pregnant actress Demi Moore on the cover of Vanity Fair magazine).
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women to possess but not as valuable or important in and of
themselves (and, moreover, as demeaning for men to have). Also
implicit in this hierarchical ranking is the general inferiority of
women to men and the importance of female obedience and deference to male authority. Analyses of cultural expectations for women also have often noted the presence of a virgin/whore dynamic,
in which a woman is perceived either as the virtuous homemaker
just described or as a promiscuous, irresponsible slut, undeserving
of societal benefits or personal respect.5'
This depiction of the various stereotypes that harm women
ignores, however, the fact that outsider women are not usually
seen as passive, nurturing, or virginal and thus do not even have
the chance of being labelled "good girls." Frequently perceived as
violators of the norms of behavior fashioned for (privileged) females, they become "bad girls"-women who are deviant not only
in the sense that they are thought to reject society's rules but also
in the sense that they are, as a result, somehow less female, perhaps even less human, as well.52
These patterns are not a new discovery, of course. AfricanAmerican women writers have been pointing out for some time
now the various ways in which their group is devalued in prevailing ideology.53 Black theorist Patricia Hill Collins describes four
51. See, eg., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE LU 997, 1110-13 (1985) (noting that women in cohabitation cases are seen either
as loving "angels" who did not expect to reap any benefit from their services or immoral
"whores" who lure men into sexual relationships for personal gain).
52. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 1435-37.
53. See, eg., COLLINS, supra note 20, passim; DAVIS, supra note 20, passim; PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER, passim (1984); HOOKS, supra note 20, at 51-86;
Roberts, supra note 20, at 1436-37. I will focus primarily on African-American women,
both because more information is available about that group and because I am most
familiar with the writing that members of that group have done. It should be noted,
however, that although most of the information I will present will be on race, that category is inextricably connected to class. Since many women of color fall below the poverty
line, data about attitudes towards class are suggestive of attitudes towards race, and vice
versa. Thus, for example, poor white women seem to be subjected to some, although not
all, of the same stereotypes to which women of color are subjected. See Fineman, supra
note 1, at 287-88.
It may be worth mentioning again that I am primarily concerned with images of
outsider women that the dominant group holds and conveys through its ideology. Thus,
in describing prevailing stereotypes of women of color in general, I do not mean to be
implying that merely because many such women are subjected to those stereotypes, those
women are in fact the same. Although all outsider women might be equally stigmatized
as bad mothers, that does not mean that they all react in the same way to the social
power that such stigma exerts over them or have the same cultural conceptions of them-
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harmful images of black women: the mammy (faithful, nurturing,
asexual, obedient), the Jezebel (sexually promiscuous), the welfare
mother (irresponsible, lazy), and the matriarch (emasculating, ag-

gressive, disobedient to male authority).' These stereotypes combine to produce a somewhat contradictory image of black women
as mothers: they are usually seen as selfish, lazy, and irresponsible,
but occasionally as strong, loyal, and self-sacrificing. Ironically,
however, even these apparently positive characteristics are invoked
in a derogatory way. For example, black women's resilience and
resourcefulness have been said to be harmful to black men's sense
of manhood and therefore destructive

of the black family5 5

Moreover, the mammy image, the repository of much of the positive imagery of black women, appears to be applied to such women only when they are acting as mothers for others' children, not
when they are mothering their own.56 Virtually no part of the
usual stereotype of African-American mothers, therefore, presents
them in a positive light.5 7

Dorothy Roberts, in her recent article on the disproportionate
imposition of criminal sanctions for prenatal drug use on AfricanAmerican women, succinctly describes how black women have
been perceived as bad for centuries.58 From slavery to the Moynihan Report,5 9 the image of these women has been one of aggressiveness, sexual promiscuity, selfishness, irresponsibility, and disrespect for male authority.' Because these traits are the antithesis
selves. There is very little data, however, about such differences in the reproductive context. Cf., e.g., Rayna Rapp, ConstructingAmniocentesis: Maternal and Medical Discourses,
in UNCERTAIN TERMS, supra note 13, at 28, 37, 39 (noting possible differences in attitudes towards amniocentesis deriving from the fact that Latina women have a self-sacrificing role in their culture, whereas black women do not).
54. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 71-78.
55. The most notorious example of this assertion is the Moynihan Report, in which
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan attributed the country's poverty problems to the fact that
due to the damage done to black males by slavery and unemployment, women played an
"abnormally" prominent role in the African-American family. See GMDINGS, supra note
53, at 325-35; Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 163-65.
56. In short, when their nurturing labor is being extracted for the benefit of the
dominant class, it seems effective and benign; when it is being used in their own interests, it seems dangerous.
57. Because the mammy image is irrelevant to an inquiry about images of AfricanAmerican women as mothers of their own children, I will exclude it from my analysis.
58. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1436-44.
59. See supra note 55.
60. See, eg., Tsing, supra note 13, at 295 (noting that these attitudes are held toward
both black and lower-income white women); Ethnic Pilfering in American Society, S.F.
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of the traits associated with the normative (white) ideal of motherhood, Roberts argues, their association with black women also
makes black women seem unmaternal and undeserving of being
mothers. 61 Moreover, as Kimberl6 Crenshaw has pointed out, insufficient attention has been paid to the gender component of such
derogation of black mothers; the Moynihan Report, for example,
was criticized by many people as being racist but not as being
sexist as well.'
Martha Fineman's work on prevailing images of low-income
women and common explanations of poverty confirms these observations about the ways in which poor white women and women of
color are perceived as mothers. According to Fineman, poverty
discourse persistently depicts low-income women as lazy people
who would rather be on welfare than work and whose lack of
connection to men (since many of them are single mothers) is the
cause of their poverty.' In short, says Fineman, poor, single
women-except those who are single due to death, or perhaps divorce-are assumed to be bad mothers, and receive less government support as a result. Moreover, "[iln addition to providing a
basis to determine who is undeserving in our culture, the rhetoric

CHRON., June 11, 1986, at 48 [hereinafter Ethnic Pilfering] (citing a study that found that

whereas black women "have been taking a disproportionately bad rap for their sexual
behavior," white women were "five times as likely to abort their first pregnancy").
Patricia Hill Collins notes that both the matriarch stereotype and the welfare mother stereotype of African-American women convey the message that black women's control over their own sexuality is antithetical to white male control.
[B]oth the matriarch and the welfare mother are sexual beings. But their sexuality is linked to their fertility, and this link forms one fundamental reason they
are negative images. The matriarch represents the sexually aggressive woman,
one who emasculates Black men because she will not permit them to assume
roles as Black patriarchs ....
Similarly, the welfare mother represents a woman of low morals and uncontrolled sexuality, factors identified as the cause of
her impoverished state. In both cases Black female control over sexuality and
fertility is conceptualized as antithetical to elite white male interests.
COLLINS, supra note 20, at 78.
61. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1438.
62. Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 163-64.
63. Fineman, supra note 1, at 283-85. I do not think that it is either worthwhile or
necessary to spend any time here providing evidence that the prevailing stereotypes are
incorrect. For critiques of the demeaning "culture of poverty" notion, see, for example,
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); Donald P. Judges, Bayonets
for the Wounded. Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods, 19
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 599 (1992); Herbert J. Gans, Fighting the Bias Embedded in
Social Concepts of the Poor, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1992, at A56. For critiques
of race ideology, see, for example, DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987);
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980).
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constructs single motherhood as dangerous and even deadly, not
only to the single mothers and their children, but to society as a
whole."' Since poor, single mothers are assumed to be primarily
women of color,65 these stereotypes are applied to women of col-

or as well.66
From this brief description, it should be apparent that the
category of woman in today's society itself contains dualisms:
Outsider Women
Privileged Women
selfless

selfish

single
promiscuous, unmaternal.
irresponsible
lazy, improvident
disobedient, aggressive
towards males
It is important to emphasize that these dualisms themselves help
constitute the power that is exercised over women. That is, they
create outsider and privileged women; they produce the world as
married
asexual, maternal 7
responsible
frugal, industrious'
obedient to male authority

64. Fineman, supra note 1, at 285-86. One example of the prevailing image of women of color as dangerous and selfish is the fact that women of color are seen as more
likely to obtain abortions than white women, when in fact the opposite is true. Ethnic
Pilfering, supra note 60, at 48.
65. Fineman, supra note 1, at 275.
66. Additional examples of this racialization of the good girl/bad girl dichotomy
abound. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on
Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1369,
1377-79 (1992) (arguing that discussions of surrogate motherhood evoke the dichotomy
between the privileged, good girl, infertile woman and the low-income, minority, bad girl
surrogate).
An anecdotal example comes from a seminar I teach on law, medicine, and.reproduction. During one class's discussion of prenatal substance abuse, it was extremely difficult for me to convince the students that whites use illegal drugs as often as people of
color do. Although I referred them to specific data regarding comparative drug use, see
Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy
and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1202 (1990), it was still very difficult to get them to seriously consider the possibility that the disproportionate prosecution of women of color for prenatal drug use did not
stem from those women's disproportionate engaging in such behavior. On the targeting of
women of color for prenatal drug use prosecutions, see generally Roberts, supra note 20,
at 1432-36.
67. As previously mentioned, motherhood and sexuality are seen as mutually exclusive in this society. See supra note 50.
68. Picture, for example, a housewife clipping coupons, finding sales, or paying the
bills.
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we see and know it. They provide the interpretive field through
which individual behavior and interpersonal relationships are understood. Because the dualisms define affluent white women and
low-income white women and women of color in different ways,
those women are seen (and sometimes even see themselves) in
those ways. For these reasons, the dualisms have operated to effectuate, facilitate, and legitimate coercive treatment of outsider
women and paternalistic treatment of insider women. The next two
Sections will describe in more detail how this dynamic occurs.
C. Ideology and Coercion: How Images of Outsider Women Justify Their Subordination
1. History. The literature is rife with examples of the
racialization of the good girl/bad girl dichotomy and the use of
that dichotomy to legitimate coercion of outsider women. In fact,
it is virtually impossible to describe an example of the use of a
negative image of women of color without simultaneously recounting a story of coercive control over their sexual or reproductive
activity. The two are intimately linked; ideology justifies coercion,
coercion enforces ideology.
In a classic and appalling example of how the worldview of
the powerful can obscure and legitimate the oppression of the
powerless,69 the image of African-American women as promiscuous and animal-like has supported a practice of sexual violation
of those women that is so common it could almost be called a
tradition." During slavery, masters had virtually free access to
their female slaves and justified their sexual abuse of those women
with the assertion that black women were wantonly sexual and
therefore did not need to be treated with the protectiveness accorded their white counterparts.7 ' Slave owners also "bred" slave
69. Obscure and legitimate such oppression to the powerful is all I mean to suggest
here. For a discussion of whether prevailing ideology can similarly affect the powerless,
see infra Sections I(A)-(B).
70. See generally GJ. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN
LIFE: MALE ATrrruDEs TOWARD WOMEN AND SExuALrrY IN THE NINErEENTH-CENTU-

RY 101 (1976) (describing research and testing of clitoridectomies and infibulation on
slave women); COLLINs, supra note 20, at 167-68 (describing use of slaves as the primary
pornographic outlet for white men in Europe and America); HOOKS, supra note 20, at
24-27 (discussing the sexual abuse of slave women); Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 157-8
(rape law).
71. See HOOKS, supra note 20, at 32-33. Hooks reports that the "mass sexual exploitation of enslaved black women" occurred at the same time as the image of the white
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women to produce more slaves (including special breeding to ob-

tain light-skinned women, who were more highly prized as sexual
partners),' often separating them from their children at an early
age.
Similar abuses continued in the twentieth century. AfricanAmerican women, along with Latina (especially Puerto Rican) and
Native American women, were subjected to forced sterilization in
appalling numbers up through the 1970s,73 a practice that continues in "milder" forms today.74 Physicians felt justified in surgically removing these women's reproductive organs without consent
because they believed them to be sexually promiscuous and either
too irresponsible or too ignorant to use birth control.75 The supposedly rampant sexuality of such women was seen as posing a
threat to the public fisc, given that many of them were, or were
expected soon to be, relying on the welfare system for support.76
Similarly, in the criminal realm, judges' and law enforcement
officials' images of women of color as immoral and promiscuous
woman changed from dangerous sexual being to virtuous, asexual lady. Id. at 32; see also
id. at 25 ("White male slaveowners usually tried to bribe black women as preparation for
sexual overtures so as to place them in the role of prostitute. As long as the white
slaveowner 'paid' for the sexual services of his black female slave, he felt absolved of
responsibility for such acts.").
72. COLuNS, supra note 20, at 167-68.
73. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 215-21. In North Carolina alone, from 1933 to about
1973, over 7500 women were sterilized, supposedly due to mental deficiency. About 5000
of them were black. Id. at 217. Puerto Rican women also were sterilized at alarming
rates; by the 1970s, over 35% of women of childbearing age in Puerto Rico had been
sterilized. Id. at 219. Similarly, 24% of all Indian women of childbearing age had been
sterilized by 1976. It is estimated that in 1972 alone, between 100,000 and 200,000 sterilizations were performed under the auspices of U.S. government programs. Id. at 218.
Although the federal government promulgated detailed guidelines regulating sterilizations
in 1974, one study a year later found that only 60% of the regulated institutions were
aware of the regulations, and only 30% of all hospitals governed by them were attempting to comply. Id. at 220.
74. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income
Women, in REPRODUCTIVE LAwS FOR THE 1990S 23, 48 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub
eds., 1989) (describing overuse of hysterectomies); Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive
Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J. L. & FEMImSM 255, 275-76 (1992).
75. Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayalof the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 94
(1983) (citing Emily Diamond, Note, Coerced Sterilization Under Federally Funded Family
Planning Programs, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 595 n.39 (1976)).
76. See, &g., Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding physician's
right to request that women who were having a third child and were on public assistance
voluntarily submit to sterilization following delivery of child or seek another physician),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
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have caused and justified the routine discounting of rape charges
by those women. 7 Such attitudes have made it very difficult to
criminally punish sexual assaults on women of color, making them
virtual "free game" for attackers.'
In addition, in the family law arena, the bad mother status of
these women also has legitimated the disproportionate removal of
their children from the home through dependency and neglect
proceedings.79 Unable to see women of color as good mothers,
social services personnel have often misunderstood the AfricanAmerican practice of "fostering," under which a number of adults
in a child's extended family will care for the child at different
times, a practice that follows well-established cultural rules of kin
responsibility.' Evaluating that practice against the white norm of
the nuclear family, the child welfare system has used black
women's fostering of their children to justify findings of neglect."
In the 1980s and 1990s, coercive control of the reproductive
and sexual behavior of women of color has taken the form of
forced Cesarean sections, other forced treatment during pregnancy,
and prosecution for prenatal substance abuse or related offenses.82 Although much recent attention has been focused on legal

77. See Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.
103 (1983); see also Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 157-60. Although things are probably a
bit better today than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is still far more
difficult to obtain a conviction of a man who has raped a black woman than of one who
has raped a white woman. GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SoCLAL CONSTRUCHTON OF SExuAL ASSAULT 133, 139, 219-20 (1989).
78. A vivid example of the trivialization of sexual assaults on women of color can be
seen in the news coverage of two rapes that occurred recently in New York City. The
attack on the white, professional woman who became known as the "Central Park jogger" was treated as a tragedy of front-page proportions. The attack on a black woman
that occurred the same night received scant media attention. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, The
Intersection of Race and Gender in Rape Law, in MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE
LAW 800, 801 (1991).
79. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1441.
80. See CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN 62-89 (1970) (describing the phenomenon of
"fostering").
81. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1440-42.
82. Judges have jailed pregnant drug and alcohol users, ordered women to undergo
in utero surgery, confined women in mental hospitals, removed their children as neglected, and ordered them to be temporarily sterilized through Norplant. See generally Molly
McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277
(1987-1988) (chronicling such acts). There also have been nearly 170 criminal prosecutions of women after childbirth in the last five years, designed to affect the prenatal
behavior of both the individuals prosecuted and women in general. See LYNN M.
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control of female reproductive behavior, there is little scholarly or
public awareness that the burden of complying with judicially imposed' 3 behavioral dictates has not been evenly applied.' Nearly
every one of the women prosecuted in recent years for using drugs
while pregnant has been a low-income woman; 80% of them have
been women of color.' Similar disparities exist in the forced Cesarean section cases, in which the majority of those subjected to
court-ordered surgery are non-white women, many of them immigrants and refugees.'
Two striking recent examples of the use of negative images of
women of color to justify coercive control of their reproductive
behavior come from anthropologist Anna Tsing and law professor
Dorothy Roberts. Tsing studied law enforcement personnel's reactions to, and news coverage of, twenty-five cases of unassisted
birth-cases in which a woman gave birth alone, outside of the
hospital, and without the aid of either a doctor or a midwife. In
all these cases, the baby either was stillborn or died very shortly
after birth and was disposed of by the mother, usually in a trash

PALTROW, AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT,
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN i & n.1 (1992). The vast majority

of such prosecutions have been directed against women of color. Dawn Johnsen, Shared
Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS .J.
569, 613 (citing ACLU memorandum reporting that in 1990, 80% of prosecutions had
been against women of color); see also Greene, supra note 4, at 745 n.7 (citing ACLU
data reporting that of 55 defendants charged whose race or ethnicity was known, 32 were
African-American, two were Latina, one was Native American, and 12 were white).
Coercive interventions have taken other forms as well. The offering of plea bargains that include temporary sterilization through implantation of the contraceptive
Norplant is becoming quite a fad among judges. See Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate over Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
Proving the courts far more solicitous of the "paternal rights" (as the court put it) of
men than the "maternal rights" of women, one judge even enjoined a woman from
aborting a fetus to protect her boyfriend's interest in becoming a father. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey eventually lifted the injunction. New Jersey Supreme Court Ends
Woman's Two-Week Ordeal, 3 ACLU REPROD. RTS. UPDATE, March 27, 1992, at 3.
83. Increasingly, legislatures are authorizing such coercive interventions through statutes that, for example, define child neglect to include drug use during pregnancy. See
Kary L. Moss, Update of State Legislation Regarding Drug Use During Pregnancy (unpublished ACLU memorandum on file with the author).
84. For notable exceptions, see Ikemoto, supra note 15; Roberts, supra note 20;
Krauss, supra note 20.
85. Johnsen, supra note 82.
86. See infra notes 107-07 and accompanying text.
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can. When the infant was found, the mother was charged with a
crime, often murderY
Tsing found a striking difference in sentences assigned to the
women convicted in these cases, depending on which of two images of them legal officials and the public entertained. Young, white,
privileged women were generally perceived as good girls gone bad,
as suffering from what Tsing called "criminal warped innocence. ' 'i Their unassisted births were seen as youthful mistakes
from which they could learn a lesson, and a mild criminal sanction
was thus thought sufficient to reform them. As a result, their sentences were usually slaps on the hand-for example, probation.89
In contrast, older white women, low-income white women, and all
women of color were perceived as bad girls and sentenced accordingly. The discourse surrounding these women depicted them as
willfully refusing to give birth in the hospital as they "should"
have. According to Tsing, they were punished for their autonomy,
for their rejection of medical rules of birthing.' In short, it was
.their disobedience to the male-identified medical establishment
that made them "bad" mothers. Moreover, their acts were perceived as consistent with their general character, rather than as
lapses of judgment. They were seen as deviants who could not be
changed but only controlled, and their sentences were shockingly
severe. Sarah Berkeley, for example, a 28-year-old white woman
on welfare who had not known she was pregnant, was charged
with "child endangerment" and "neglect of a dependent person"
when she gave birth in a toilet to an infant who never breathed.
Despite the fact that her boyfriend called 911 as soon as they
realized she was giving birth, Ms. Berkeley was convicted and
sentenced to twenty years in prison.9'
Another example of how the stigmatization of women of color
as bad girls is used to justify coercive interventions in their reproductive lives comes from Roberts's article on criminal punishment
of women of color for prenatal 'substance abuse. Roberts asserts
that the image of the undeserving mother partially accounts for
the fact that prenatal drug use by such women is both more fre-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Tsing,
Id.at
Id at
Id.at
Id.at

supra note 13, at 282.
289.
289, 291.
285.
295.
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quently reported and more often sanctioned than prenatal drug
use by white women. 2 Arguing that the only realistic way for a
drug-addicted, pregnant woman to escape criminal charges is to
abort the fetus,9' she suggests that the real crime for which such

women are being charged is the failure to have an abortion:94
"They are punished," Roberts contends, "because the combination
of their poverty, race, and drug addiction is seen to make them
unworthy of procreating."'
Thus, throughout history, the stereotype of outsider women,
especially women of color, as promiscuous and irresponsible has
justified coercive control of their reproductive activities. From slavery to forced sterilization to the modem criminalization of prenatal
behavior, the racist and classist nature of legal interventions in
those activities has been obscured by the racist and classist images
that are invoked to justify them.'
2. Good Patients and Bad Patients: The Images in the Medical Context. Physicians' treatment of low-income white women
and women of color reveals that the same sets of associations described above operate in the medical arena as well. Several studies
have found that poor Women of color receive different treatment
at the hands of medical professionals than do privileged EuropeanAmerican women, and that that treatment is associated with negative stereotypes about such women.' Sociologist Alexandra
92. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1432-34; see also Chasnoff et al., supra note 66 (reporting that despite comparable substance abuse rates in the two populations, AfricanAmerican women were ten times more likely than white women to be reported for prenatal drug use).
93. This alternative usually is the only one available because there are so few detoxification programs that will accept pregnant women. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1448;
Hoffman, supra note 3, at 57.
94. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1445.
95. Id at 1472. For a similar example of how privileged women's rights to reproductive autonomy become transformed into outsider women's duties not to reproduce, see
DAVIS, supra note 20, at 210 (describing how in the birth control movement of the nineteenth century, "[w]hat was [initially] demanded as a 'right' for the privileged came to be
interpreted as a 'duty' for the poor").
96. Again, I am addressing primarily the views of the dominant group. My assumption is that, despite internalized racism and classism, those subjected to such interventions
were and are often more aware than those perpetrating them of the falseness of the
stereotypes being invoked.
97. See, eg., Julia A. Boyd, Ethics and Cultural Diversity in Feminist Theory: Keys to
Power, in THE BLACK WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK at 226-34 (Evelyn C. White ed., 1990)

(describing barriers to adequate psychiatric treatment of black women); Vida L. Jones,
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Dundas Todd, in her study of interactions between gynecologists
and women patients, found that
the darker a woman's skin and/or the lower her place on the
economic scale, the poorer the care and efforts at explanation
she received. Women of color and/or an economically poor background were more apt to be seen as "difficult" patients when
they asked questions, were more likely ... to be talked down to,
scolded, and patronized."
Todd reports that such women were also more likely to be urged
to use the Pill or the IUD-both of which are often dangerous,
uncomfortable, or painful1--as birth control methods, rather than
the diaphragm."° She attributes this differential treatment to the
fact that low-income white women and women of color were generally perceived as too unintelligent, irresponsible, or unmotivated
to use a method such as the diaphragm."' 1
Physicians perceive minority women not only as noncompliant
patients but also as litigious ones. Contrary to reality, they believe
that poor patients are generally more likely to sue than other patients"~ and therefore (given the conflation of the categories0 3 )
assumedly think the same of most women of color. They also are
much more likely to suspect that such women are drug abusers. In
a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, African-American mothers were found to be ten times more likely to
be screened and reported for substance abuse during pregnancy
than white mothers, although the actual levels of drug use in the
two populations were comparable.'0 4
As previously mentioned, in the Cesarean section context this
pattern continues. The leading study in the area, a national survey
covering forty-five states and the District of Columbia, found that
Lupus and Black Women: Managing a Complex Chronic Disability, in id. at 160, 164
(discussing the effect of racial bias on diagnoses of lupus).
98. ALEXANDRA D. TODD, INTM TE ADVERsARIES 77 (1989).
99.

See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECrIVE, THE NEW OUR BOD-

ms OURSELVES 240, 251 (1984).
100. TODD, supra note 98, at 77.
101. See, ag., id. at 73-74. Todd's book is replete with examples of how negative images of both outsider women and privileged women cause medical practitioners not only
to disregard or misunderstand their patients' wishes but also to provide ineffective medical treatment.
102. McNulty, supra note 82, at 298.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
104. Chasnoff et al., supra note 66.

1993]

COLONIZATION OF THE WOMB

of the women subjected to court-ordered Cesarean sections, 80%
were women of color (47% African-American, 33% African or
Asian) and only 20% were white Americans. Fifty percent were
unmarried, and 27% did not speak English as their primary language."5 All of the women either were treated in a teachinghospital clinic or were receiving public assistance.' 16 Maternal
competency was investigated in only 15% of all the cases of obstetrical interventions that the investigators studied,"° suggesting
that it was not concern about the woman's legal ability to decide
that motivated the physicians and judges handling the cases.
Although this study does not provide detailed accounts of the
physicians' justifications for seeking intervention in these instances,
the language used in case reports about forced Cesarean sections
suggests that the doctors tend to see the women against whom
they seek such orders as bad mothers."° For example, in one article on the subject, four obstetricians speculated that when a
woman refuses surgical intervention in her labor, "[i]t is probable
that the patient hopes to be freed in this way of [a] pregnancy...
undesired because it is an unplanned pregnancy, the woman is divorced or widowed, the pregnancy is an extramarital one, there
are inheritance problems, etc."'" Another case report relates
that the doctors and nurses attending the woman in question
viewed her refusal of the surgery as evidencing "unreasonable
insensitivity to the welfare of her infant," and that they were "bewildered and angered by her attitude and stubbornness."" 0 The
authors of this article also made a point of mentioning that the

105. Kolder et al., supra note 14, at 1192, 1193. It is striking that, apparently, none of
these women were Latina.

106. Id. at 1193.
107. Id.
108. Lisa Ikemoto has similarly argued that both judges and doctors view women
against whom treatment orders are sought and obtained as bad mothers. See Ikemoto,
supra note 15, at 510-12. As Ikemoto notes, "When a court orders the forced medical
treatment of a woman for the sake of fetal interests, it deems that woman a bad mother.
So, at the least, these cases tell us that a good mother would consent." Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
109. J.R. Leiberman et al., The Fetal Right to Live, 53 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
515, 515 (1979).
110. Watson A. Bowes, Jr. & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical
and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 211 (1981). In this case, the

surgery was sought for a patient who was obese, a condition that significantly raises the
risks attendant to Cesareans. See George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkind
Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CrR. REP., June 1982, at 16, 17.
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woman lost custody of her children several months after undergoing the forced Cesarean."' Since, as the article states, this ruling
was unrelated to the events surrounding the birth, it is difficult to
avoid drawing the conclusion that the authors mention it only
because they view it as confirming their negative assessment of the
woman's character and thereby mean to suggest that refusing the
Cesarean itself was also a neglectful act.
The dynamic operating here is more complicated, however,
than the data about coerced Cesareans reveal. As is the case with
other types of medical technology, Cesareans are provided, in
general, at a much higher rate to affluent women than to poor
women."' Since minorities are a disproportionately large share of
the poor," it is therefore likely that Cesareans also are provided
at a higher rate to white women than to women of color. Given
that the primary reason for ordering a Cesarean is concern for the
welfare of the fetus,"' these data make one wonder whether the
difference in rates might suggest greater physician concern about
affluent white fetuses than black, brown, or low-income white
ones." 5 The greater rate of prescribing the surgery for privileged
women also, of course, makes the prevalence of court-ordered Csections for outsider women all the more striking.
In that respect, the Cesarean data epitomize the situation in
which outsider women find themselves in the medical realm, where
they are often simultaneously coerced into undergoing some procedures and deprived of access to others. A brief reference to history sheds some light on this apparently contradictory situation. At
the inception of the birth control movement of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, Margaret Sanger and other activists
presented contraception as a woman's right. These reformers,
primarily upper-class white women, saw birth control as a privilege-as part of their autonomy over their bodies. However, the

111. Bowes & Selegstad, supra note 110, at 211.
112. DEBORAH A. SuLuvAN & ROSE WErTZ, LABOR PAINS 37 (1988); Linda R.

Monroe, Affluent Women Twice as Likely as Poor to Have Cesarean Births, L.A. TIMES,
July 27, 1989, § 1, at 3.
113. See supra text accompanying note 36.
114. Rhoden, supra note 14, at 1956.
115. The fact that affluent women have more and better insurance coverage also
might explain part of the differential, but I doubt that it explains all of it. For example,
in In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986), the woman was a college student, which would suggest that she probably had insurance. For a
discussion of Madyun, see infra subsection I(C)(3).
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movement spearheaded by the American Birth Control League
eventually took on a eugenic flavor, and, by the time it became
associated with the efforts of the Eugenics Society and focused its
efforts on getting contraceptives to low-income women, birth control had become an obligation, rather than a right."6
I would suggest that a similar dynamic may be at work here.
When a laboring woman is defined as a good girl, the physician is
likely to have concern for the well-being of her child and to offer
the surgery to her as valuable medical technology. In the event
that she refuses it, however, her motivations are not as likely to
be questioned, her autonomy is likely to be valued, and she is
unlikely to be ordered to comply with the doctor's advice. In contrast, when the laboring woman is seen as a bad girl, reduced
concern for her offspring (and, probably, less medical insurance
coverage for surgeries) translates into fewer offers of C-sections.
However, the concomitant lack of trust in her maternal judgment
and selflessness is reflected in a perceived need to coerce her into
complying with the doctor's orders. Just as Sanger trusted privileged women, but not outsider women, to make "responsible"
reproductive decisions, so in this context physicians and judges are
not willing to trust the judgments of those not of their kind. Fur-,
thermore, in both situations, that distrust expresses a reaction to
outsider women's failure to comply with white middle-class behavioral norms, such as limiting family size or obeying doctors. In
short, both Sanger's movement and modem medical practices
coercively impose one group's norms on another.
Historically, outsider women have been plagued not only by
medical acceptance of this bad mother image but also by
physicians' belief that such women are somehow less than human.
For example, female slaves were used as guinea pigs in the nineteenth century by an obstetrical surgeon who believed that they
were impervious to the pain involved." 7 More recently, women
of color not only have been the unknowing subjects of experimentation but also have been subjected to unnecessary procedures,8
such as hysterectomies, in order to train medical residents."

116. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 210-15.
117. BARKER-BENFiELD, supra note 70, at 101.
118. Sharon deMaehl & Linda Thurston, Crimes in the Clinic: A Report on Boston
City Hospital.. ., 2 THE SECOND WAVE 17, 17 (1973); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 74,
at 39 (citing GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE
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Women of color also tend to receive less pain medication during
labor than privileged women, again reflecting medical presuppositions about their strength and (supposedly) animal-like imperviousness to pain." 9 The chilling dehumanization of such patients
fostered by the20 process of medical school socialization legitimates
such practices.

3. Good and Bad Control: The Images in the Legal Context. Discussions of Cesarean section cases by both legal academicians and judges reveal that legal assessments of such cases are
affected by and reflect imagery similar to that found in medical
discourse. I will discuss two examples: the work of John Robertson, a law professor who writes frequently in the area of reproductive rights and reproductive technology, and the case of In re
Madyun Fetus," one of the few forced Cesarean section cases
for which there is a published judicial opinion." Robertson is
the preehilnent advocate of increased interventions in the reproductive lives of women." Although he does not specifically address the racial composition of the group against whom such interventions have been imposed, it seems highly unlikely that he is
unaware of that composition. Moreover, to my knowledge there is
no law review article advocating forced C-sections that explicitly
discusses either the impact of reproductive control mechanisms on
outsider women or the author's vision of what types of women
might need such control. Therefore, it seems appropriate to ana-

MISTREATS WOMEN 200--03 (Harper Colophon 1985) (1977)).
119. DIANA SCULLY, MEN WHO CONTROL WOMEN'S HEALTH: THE MISEDUCATION
OF OBSmRICIAN-GYNECOLOGISTS 43 (1980).

120. Id. at 120-40. To some extent, the dynamic between male physicians and female
patients that I am describing is not unlike the dynamics that characterize all doctor-patient relations. See TODD, supra note 98, at 121-23. However, the general elevation of
male over female in this society, as well as the particular content of the dualisms associated with each, exaggerate and give particular content to the hierarchical relation between women and their (male) physicians. As such, it deserves separate treatment.
121. 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).
122. See supra note 14.
123. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: the Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986); John A. Robertson,
In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (1990); Robertson, supra note 15; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39
EMORY LJ. 697 (1990); John A. Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal
Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333 (1982); John A. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So
Novel After All, 13 HASTINGS CTR REP., Oct. 1983, at 28.
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lyze Robertson's position, even though it is not explicitly directed
at outsider women. The Madyun case more explicitly raises
race
12 4
and class issues because it involved a black, Muslim woman.
Distinguishing between the freedom to procreate and freedom
in procreation, Robertson argues that once a woman decides to
carry her pregnancy to term she has no constitutional right to
make her own decisions about how her pregnancy and labor will
be conducted."2 Rather, she has a legal duty not to put her fetus at risk and can be subject to homicide or child abuse charges
for violating that duty.' 6 This obligation would not only require
a pregnant woman to accede to a Cesarean section but also would
preclude her refusal of "established," "safe" fetal therapy' 27 and
could be grounds for prohibiting her from smoking, drinking, or
otherwise failing to maintain her own health."2
Robertson sees the interests at stake in coercive intervention
cases as grossly unequal. The risk of a Cesarean to the fetus he
correctly identifies as that of bodily injury, impairment, or death.
The mother's interests, however, he defines as her "wish for vaginal delivery" or even her "insistence on vaginal delivery."' 29 Similarly, in discussing home birth, Robertson identifies the woman's
interest as having a "satisfying [birth] experience"'' 3 and opines
that "[a] woman's interest in an aesthetically pleasing or emotionally satisfying birth should not be satisfied at the expense of the
child's safety."'' These statements reveal that Robertson clearly
has little sympathy for women who might reject the traditional
medical model by refusing surgical interventions or by birthing at
home. Reducing their concerns for the safety of their infants or

124. It is unclear from the case whether the woman was an African-American or an
African.

125. Robertson, supra note 15, at 410-11.
126. Id. at 438-39.
127. Fetal therapy-medical procedures performed on the fetus in the womb-is increasingly possible as a way to address fetal impairment but is not without risks to both
mother and fetus. See generally Ruth Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent
Advances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RE'. 201 (1982).
128.

A pregnant woman could even be required to undergo prenatal diagnosis, Rob-

ertson, supra note 15, at 449-50, and could be "excluded . . . from workplaces inimical
to fetal health," id. at 443.
129. Id. at 455.
130. Id. at 406. He cites this as a general concern underlying women's interests in
controlling the "timing and details" of reproductive activity. Id.
131. Id. at 453.
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themselves 32 to "aesthetic" preoccupations, he treats such women as selfish and unreasonable-concerned more with their own
personal tastes than with the health and safety of their babies.
The reasons that Robertson proffers for why some mothers
might refuse a Cesarean section are highly suspicious of such
women's motivations and concern for their offspring. He explains
that, while most women accept their physicians' recommendations
of Cesarean surgery, "some may refuse because of religious beliefs,
eccentric preferences, idiosyncratic weightings of the values at
issue, fear of surgery, or desire not to have the child."'' The
least offensive of these postulated reasons for refusal is "religious
beliefs," a well-established ground for personal expressions of
autonomy. Robertson does not discuss this ground separately,
however, leaving the reader to assume that he considers it no
more significant than any of the others. The next reason, "eccentric preferences," clearly seeks to delegitimize the woman's concerns; it suggests that they are whimsical and subjective and therefore entitled to little deference. The third reason, "idiosyncratic
weightings of the values at issue," again clearly constructs the objecting woman as abnormal and outside the bounds of conventional morality. Moreover, the fact that it is values that are being
weighed leads to the inescapable conclusion that Robertson be-

132. For discussion of the risks of C-sections for both women and fetuses, see infra
notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
133. Robertson, supra note 15, at 455 n.162. Robertson does mention additional disadvantages of Cesareans.
A cesarean section . . . often leaves women feeling inadequate, guilty, and
disappointed. It may interfere with early bonding between mother and infant,
lead to medical complications and unappealing scars, require subsequent deliveries to be by cesarean section, and cost more money than vaginal delivery.
Id. at 454. However, because he includes none of these disadvantages in his list of reasons for why some women might refuse Cesareans, it seems unlikely that he views any of
them as sufficiently important to cause such refusals. Furthermore, Robertson never mentions the more significant concerns that might prompt rejection of C-sections, such as
(well-founded) distrust of fetal monitor readings, see infra note 265, or the desire to
avoid a doubled risk of death (to oneself). See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
Instead, his list of disadvantages (like his list of reasons for refusal), by focusing primarily
on what would definitely seem to be "aesthetic" concerns-such as mother-child bonding,
scars, and feelings of anxiety-deemphasizes the health interests of the mother and ignores those of the fetus altogether. Taken together, both lists have the effect of
trivializing the mother's interests. Thus, although a legitimate refusal of the surgery seems
theoretically possible to Robertson-indeed, he states that the decision "should be left to
the woman's choice unless her choice poses a clear threat to the child," id. at 455--it
seems highly unlikely that, in practical application, he would ever find a woman's refusal
to be legitimate.
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lieves these women might actually value their own (implicitly selfish and trivial) preferences over the safety of their children. Completely absent from this formulation is the possibility that the
woman might have legitimate concerns for her own safety or that
of the fetus."M Robertson's analysis clearly evinces neither an
awareness of the history of outsider women's mistreatment at the
hands of the medical profession nor any recognition that they may
have legitimate reason to distrust medical diagnoses as a result.
"Fear of surgery," the fourth reason, evokes the traditional disparaging image of weak femininity and suggests the need for a strong
court to force the woman to do the right thing. The fifth reason,
"desire not to have the child,"1"5 not only questions the integrity
of the mother 36 but also sounds the theme of maternal dangerousness: these women are so evil that they would kill their fetuses
just to avoid taking care of them.

134. Id. at 455 n.162. Joel Finer similarly implies that some women who refuse Cesareans are irrational. Finer, supra note 15, at 276, 287. His list of possible reasons for
refusal includes "fear of stigmatization," "disbelief of the medical diagnosis," "desire not
to have the baby," and "the undesirability of an abdominal sear." Id. at 276. Although
sympathetically noting that women's reasons for refusal are "hardly whimsical," id. at 287,
he also emphasizes that C-sections are low-risk surgery, iU. at 276-77, and implies that
"pain, confusion, drugs, stress, or excitement" might hamper the woman's decisionmaking
abilities during labor, id. at 287. Thus, despite his apparent efforts to sympathize with
women who refuse C-sections-and despite the fact that he does envision some limitations on courts' power to order the surgery-the ultimate vision of such an individual
that Finer's article conveys, to me at least, is of either the paradigmatic hysterical pregnant woman (privileged, white?) or the destructive anti-mother (poor, of color?). Finer
most certainly is aware of the disproportionate effect of surgical interventions on women
of color, but he dispenses with that issue in one sentence, contending that the clear and
convincing evidence standard that he proposes will limit the tendency to "overemphasize
ceseareans" for those individuals. Id. at 282.
135. In discussing maternal refusals of fetal surgery, Robertson proffers a similar list
of explanatory factors, but in that list this fifth factor is described as "a desire to avoid
the responsibilities of parenting." Robertson, supra note 15, at 444 n.120. Thus, it is
likely that in the Cesarean context, too, he is assuming that this lack of desire for a
child comes from wanting to avoid parental responsibilities, rather than from other concerns, such as inability to provide for the child.
136. Although there are isolated cases of women who purportedly refused Cesarean
sections out of a desire to avoid being parents, see Finer, supra note 15, at 276 n2.04
(citing Jurow & Paul, stipra note 14), those cases are certainly exceptional. Moreover,
they should be seen as an indictment of a legal system that has effectively precluded the
abortion option for the majority of women, see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which precludes public funding of abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same), rather than as an indictment of the women
themselves.
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In summary, Robertson's image of the woman who would
refuse a Cesarean section is clearly that of the bad girl. His discourse suggests that although most women would accede to their
doctors' orders and undergo the recommended surgery, some abnormally selfish or abnormally weak individuals will not. Whether
he envisions these people as white or black, privileged or poor, it
is clear that he believes they do not live up to the accepted moral
code for pregnant women. As a result, coercive control of their reproductive activities is justified.
The opinion of Judge Richard A. Levie in Madyun, although
much less judgmental in tone, nevertheless reveals a similar
skepticism about the moral worth and decisionmaking capacity of
the-mother involved in that case. The case of Ayesha Madyun, a
19-year-old black college student experiencing her first pregnancy,
was brought before the judge when physicians concluded that her
labor was progressing so slowly that there was a significant risk of
infection to the fetus. Ms. Madyun and her husband objected to
the surgery both for religious reasons' 37 and on the ground that
it was unnecessary. Concluding that the "stronger basis" for the
Madyuns' position was their disbelief in the need for surgery,
the judge ordered the hospital "to take such steps as are medically
indicated, including but not limited to a C-section,
to preserve and
139
protect the birth and safety of the fetus.'
Although not questioning the genuineness of the Madyuns'
feelings about their situation, Judge Levie nevertheless seemed to
view their position as selfish, contending that he could not "indulge the desires of the parents" when those desires put the fetus
at risk:' "It is one thing," he wrote, "for an adult to gamble
with nature regarding his or her own life; it is quite another when
the gamble involves the life or death of an unborn infant."'41 To
him, the couple was gambling-taking a high-stakes risk in the
hopes of having the luck to come out unscathed. They were not
engaging in reasoned decisionmaking, careful weighing of risks and
benefits, or responsible parenting. Rather, they were being self-

137. They said that a Muslim woman had the right to decide whether to risk her life
to eliminate a possible risk to her fetus. In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep.
2233, 2239 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).
138. IaMat 2240.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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indulgent, selfishly eschewing the safe path provided by the doctors. 42 Noting that he would not allow them to make "martyrs"
of their fetus, 43 the judge clearly saw the Madyuns' efforts as
not only selfish but foolish as well. To him, they were either wellmeaning but misguided zealots or reckless risk-takers.'"
It is possible, of course, that Judge Levie was absolutely correct about the Madyuns. In the face of medical testimony that
there was a 50% to 75% chance of fetal infection but only a
0.25% risk to the mother from a Cesarean, 45 the couple's objections to the surgery would no doubt have seemed unreasonable to
many. If one accepts Judge Levie's conclusion that the situation
posed "minimal" risks to the mother and "significant" risks to the
fetus,"4 it is difficult indeed to understand why any parents
would refuse the operation other than for selfish or irrational reasons.
The judge's reliance on the medical testimony seems less
understandable, however, if one probes the assumptions that underlie it. As the next Section attempts to demonstrate, the prevailing societal image of medicine as based on neutral, scientific truth
obscures the race, class, and gender biases that permeate it. Moreover, that image also reinforces negative stereotypes of outsider

142. It is difficult to imagine what purpose the judge thought the Madyuns sought to
accomplish through such supposedly selfish impulses. One wonders as well whether Ms.
Madyun's articulation of her religious interest in such secular terms did not weaken the
appeal of her position. By stating her religious objection in terms of her right to choose
to put her own interests ahead of those of her fetus, she probably increased the court's
tendency to see her as acting out of selfishness, rather than faith. The irony here is that
it seems plausible that she may have intentionally framed her Muslim religious views in
terms of decisional autonomy in an attempt to make them understandable to a (presumably) European-American judge.
143. Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2240.
144. One can only guess what role the Madyuns' race and non-Western religion
played in the judge's reaction to them. Given the statistics on forced Cesareans, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that their "otherness" made it easier for him to dismiss
their concerns. On the other hand, the fact that Ms. Madyun was a married woman who
appeared at the hospital with her husband may very well have saved her from the
dismissive treatment so often encountered by women who refuse Ceseareans. See, ag.,
Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 506 (noting that when a court has refused to order medical
treatment, the woman has usually been married); see also Jost, supra note 15, at 86 (noting that few court-ordered C-section cases are fully litigated and that most opinions in
such cases provide only a brief, perfunctory justification for the order). Jost called Judge
Levie's two-page opinion in Madyun "exceptional for its length." I&
145. Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2239.
146. Id. at 2240.
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women by legitimizing physicians' characterizations of women who
refuse C-sections as irresponsible mothers. Disabling the courts
from imagining any alternative explanations for such behavior, the
legitimacy of medicine contributes to judges' decisions to authorize
coercive interventions in labor.
D. Hegemony and Habit: How the Legitimacy of Modern Medicine Obscures Exercises of Power Against Both Privileged and
Outsider Women
The scientific world view is accepted by scientists and laypeople
alike. It is a belief system that denies its own reality as a world
view, believing instead that it is a series of truths about knowing
and controlling the unpredictable world we live in. 47
As discussed above, one of the key traits associated with
outsider women is disobedience of male authority in general and,
in the reproductive context, of medical authority in particular.'
Concomitantly, privileged women's role as good mothers includes
the stricture that they be obedient to physicians. I will argue in
this Section that this identification of obedience to medical authority with female goodness is elicited through the construction of
medicine as a neutral social practice based on a scientific and
objective body of knowledge. That is, it is because physicians are
assumed to be the possessors of objective "expertise" that both
courts and consumers believe women should follow this advice and
give credence to their identification of particular individuals as
good or bad mothers. Hence, the legitimacy of medicine as a scientific discourse obscures the coercive exercise of social power that
both consented and court-ordered Cesarean sections represent.
Science has been called the religion of modern times, and
probably only a fool would attempt to convince a reader, in the
course of a law review article no less, that medicine, the form of
science most widely used by the consuming public, is not "scientific." Yet that is what I must do here, for central to my argument is
the notion that medicine is a hegemonic discourse-that it is laden
with value choices and beliefs that masquerade as truth, nature,
and biological "fact." My argument will be limited, however, to
that part of medicine that deals with women and their reproduc147. TODD, supra note 98, at 104.
148. See supra Sections I(B)-(C).
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tive processes, and I will not attempt to prove my point-a rather
misguided effort anyway in an argument premised on profound
skepticism about the notion of empirical proof itself-so much as
to present a substantial amount of material suggestive of it.
Raising questions about medicine's image as scientific is important to my argument for two reasons. First, as noted above,
coercive interventions in the reproductive lives of outsider women
are justified not only by the bad girl image of such women but
also by the "expert" assessments of medical professionals in their
role as "neutral" and "objective" identifiers of bad mothering.4 9
Second, challenging the status of medicine is important because, in
the area of reproduction, privileged women have been subordinated more by force of habit than by direct and obvious acts of coercion. Although some have certainly been subjected to unwanted
surgeries and court-ordered interventions, most privileged women
who have undergone such procedures have done so willingly. As
previously mentioned, while most forced Cesarean sections are
performed on outsider women, a higher proportion of privileged
women actually undergo the surgery. 5 ' Despite the fact that Csections are notoriously overused in this country, privileged women
apparently accede to doctors' orders to have them most of the
time. Like my friend Jessica Norton, these women probably see
themselves as good girls and their physicians as neutral experts.
Taking seriously their role as selfless nurturers, they probably see
obedience to doctors as part of that role and disobedience as evidence that one is a bad mother.'5 ' Thus, medicine's scientific image simultaneously justifies coercion of outsider women and elicits
passive compliance from privileged women.
In this Section, I will review the dualisms contained within
societal images of medicine, the intersection of those dualisms with
the gender categories previously described, and the ways in which
these two sets of images operate together to obscure the power
struggles inherent in cases in which doctors recommend Cesarean
sectiofis and women refuse them. Returning to Madyun, I will use
149. See supra subsection (I)(C)(3).
150. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
151. Anecdotal evidence in support of this assertion comes from the seminar I teach
on reproduction. Most of the women students in the class tend to be white, apparently
mid- to high-income, and invariably most of them have little sympathy for women who
refuse to follow doctors' orders, viewing them as recklessly, if not willfully, putting their
children at risk.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:492

that case to illustrate how law's acceptance of medicine's self-image both perpetuates that image, thus contributing to the mystification of privileged women, and enforces it, thus preventing outsider
women from prevailing in their challenges to medical authority.
1. Science Versus Superstition: CulturalImages of Medicine.
The story of the rise of the psychomedical experts-the doctors,
the psychologists, and sundry related professionals-might be told
as an allegory of science versus superstition: on the one side, the
clear-headed, masculine spirit of science; on the other side, a
dark morass of female superstition, old wives' tales, rumors preserved as fact."'
Our cultural image of medicine is fairly easy to describe.
Everyone knows that medicine is a type of science, and by that a
number of things are meant. First, science focuses on the physical
world, rather than the mental aspects of human existence; it is
concerned with determining what the natural world (including our
human bodies) is like, not with metaphysical questions, such as the
meaning of life. We all know that science is not philosophy, and it
certainly is not literature.
However, what differentiates science in general, and medicine
in particular, from the humanities is not just its focus of inquiry
but also its methodology. Through the use of the scientific method,
it is thought, science can continually test and perfect the knowledge it acquires, moving ever closer to a "true" understanding of
the world and the individuals who occupy it. As one sociologist
puts it, science sees itself as engaged in "pure, objective inquiry in
which observed facts confirm or disconfirm hypotheses .... Historical connections and human influences are not considered part
of science. Any connection between descriptions of the world and
human assumptions or between categories and categorizers is denied. Rather, science is seen as value-free ... .","Its practitio-

ners are thought to obtain neutral information through neutral
methods; Thomas Kuhn notwithstanding," 4 their own worldviews,

152.
153.
154.
posed

BARBARA EHRENREICH, FOR HER OwN GOOD 29 (1978).

TODD, supra note 98, at 107.
Kuhn, of course, is famous for having raised serious questions about the supahistorical validity of the hard sciences in his landmark work. See THOMAS S.
KUHN, TiE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLtIoNs (1962).
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personal preferences, or moral convictions are seen as having no
effect on the knowledge they produce. 5
Finally, science (and medicine) is seen as concerned with
controlling the natural world, as well as with understanding it." 6
Social commentators continually marvel at the ways in which science and the technology it produces have enabled human beings
to overcome the most formidable natural barriers to their desired
ends. We have escaped gravity to deposit people on the moon,
built dams to constrain and re-route rivers, 57 and harnessed atoms to produce weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. In the
area of medicine, this theme of controlling nature is particularly
evident.' Technological advances have totally transformed what
we mean by life and death, allowing tiny babies to survive and
prosper after premature births and the elderly or those with permanent brain damage to exist (if not exactly "live") far beyond
anything previously thought possible. Technology is extolled for
enabling physicians to overcome "imperfections" in a woman's
reproductive organs by removing eggs from ovaries, fertilizing
them in petri dishes, and then returning them to the uterus. Physicians correct bad eyesight, replace torn ligaments, set broken
bones, refashion hearts. Central to our notion of medicine is its
role in controlling and transforming our bodies.
Upon examination, it can be seen that this view strongly associates science with many of the same terms that are traditionally
associated with men; whereas, the opposite of science (anything
that is unscientific) is associated with opposed and feminized
159
terms. Science is thought to be an objective, neutral, rational,
fact-based method of controlling nature, whereas non-"scientific"

155. See EVELYN F. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER SCIENCE 69-70 (1985).
156. On the history of the association of women with nature and the view that both
need to (and can be) controlled, see CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE:
WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 127-91 (1980).
157. The Great Flood of 1993, which occurred after I wrote this Article, makes it
likely that in the future this particular accomplishment will be viewed with considerably
more humility.
158. See BARBARA K. ROTHMAN, IN LABOR: WOMEN AND POWER IN THE BIRTHPLACE (1991) (addressing medicine's efforts to control childbirth and nature); TODD,
supra note 98, at 123-24.
159. See KELLER, supra note 155, at 76-77. Keller also notes that science is associated
with the "masculine" traits of "autonomy, separation, and distance," and with "a radical
rejection of any commingling of subject and object, which are, it now appears, quite consistently identified as male and female." Id. at 79.
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forms of knowledge are usually stigmatized as superstition and
ignorance and thought to be based on subjective, biased, and emotional assessments of reality. Non-science is also clearly associated
with women: the phrase "old wives' tale," for example, makes
quite explicit the cultural equation between bad health care and
women, simultaneously defining women's knowledge as non-scientific and dismissing it as erroneous.1 Moreover, women are
seen not only as the source of dangerous medical advice but also
as the sites of dangerous disease and decay. 6 ' In short, as will
become more clear from the discussion below, women are often
treated as the prototypical embodiment of the natural world that
science exists to control.162
I can imagine many readers arriving at this point only to say,
"So what? Medicine and science are, generally, objective and rational. Of course they are imperfect and will continually improve, but
they are nevertheless as close as we can get to a neutral and accurate understanding of the world." Many recent writings, however,
have fundamentally challenged that confidence in medical knowledge."6 i have already briefly presented one such set of challenges, those that identify the effect of race and gender bias on
medical practice. 64 I suspect, however, that many readers of that
description still find the Madyun case hard to criticize. The tendency is to conclude that although the presence of disrespectful
views towards outsider women might be a blemish on the face of
the system, its basic medical premises are nevertheless correct. As
one judge who has ordered C-sections said to me, "If the doctors

160. As Keller notes,
A circular process of mutual reinforcement is established in which what is
called scientific receives extra validation from the cultural preference for what is
called masculine, and, conversely, what is called feminine-be it a branch of
knowledge, a way of thinking, or woman herself-becomes further devalued by
its exclusion from the special social and intellectual value placed on science and
the model science provides for all intellectual endeavors.
Id at 92.
161. See infra subsection (I)(D)(2).
162. TODD, supra note 98, at 111; see also KELLER, supra note 155, at 76-79 (noting
that science is identified as masculine); MERCHANT, supra note 156, at 127-191 (outlining
the development of Western views of both women and. nature as chaotic, dangerous, and
in need of control).
163. See, eg., EMILY MARTIN, THE WoMAN IN THE BODY 54-67 (1992) (discussing
how images of women affect medical understandings of the birthing process).
164. See supra subsection I(C)(2).
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say it's necessary, what else can I do?"' 6 Indeed, what else can
one do if the odds are that the medical decision is right?
What I want to argue in this subsection, however, is that
things are actually much more complicated. I will start from the
fundamental assumption, long accepted in the social sciences, that
biological science is a product of culture, rather than an entity
existing separate and apart from the world it attempts to
know."6 In other words, the very categories through which medical scientists comprehend the world are themselves the product of
the culture in which they live. Medicine is a social construct, rather than a set of "truths" about the world. 67 To accept this premise is not to say that medicine is "wrong" or that it never works
but that its understanding is partial, its truths contingent.
Applying this insight to the reproductive context, I will contend, therefore, that the field of obstetrics is not a domain in
which experts use generally unchallengeable "facts" about human
reproduction to facilitate the birthing process, but rather that it is
an arena of struggle over the role(s) of women in society and
indeed over the meaning of the word "woman."'8 Before turning to that broader point, however, I must first add one last piece
of the picture of how Western dualisms operate in the realm of
medicine by discussing how the reproductive process itself is perceived.
2. The Medical Model of Reproduction. As many writers
have pointed out, medicine (as practiced in the United States)
conceives of female reproductive processes, from menstruation to
childbirth to menopause, as pathological, disease-like conditions
that need to be controlled to prevent them from harming the
women in whose bodies they occur (or, in the case of childbirth,
the fetuses those women are carrying). 69 Medical anthropologist
165. This is my best recollection of what the judge said to me, although it may not
be an exact quote.
166. See, ag. KUHN, supra note 154 (arguing that scientific paradigms vary over time
due to the effects of culture).
167. See generally hi; TODD, supra note 98, at 101-29 (arguing that medicine is sodally constructed); Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 329-31 (same).
168. It is especially a struggle over the meaning of the ideal image of womanhood
and over who is treated as measuring up to that ideal.
169. See, eg., MARTIN, supra note 163, at 45 (describing how menstruation is conceived of as a dysfunctional disintegration); RoTHmAN, supra note 158, at 36 (noting that
doctors sometimes see women's reproductive processes as disease-like).
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Emily Martin, for example, explains that although the lining of the
stomach is periodically sloughed off in a way very similar to that
which occurs to the lining of the uterus during menstruation, medical textbooks call the stomach process rejuvenation but describe
menstruation as a debilitating disorder and as a "failure" of the
primary function of the female reproductive system (child-producing). Similarly, menopause is seen as the "degeneration" of the
uterus and is conceptualized as a breakdown in hierarchical authority, as the ovaries' failure to follow orders. 7 ' Martin uses
these and other examples to argue that medicine is inevitably
interpretive and that biological "facts" are always understood
through metaphors that categorize and provide meaning to the
world. Because of this fact, she argues, there is an irreducible
cultural element to medical knowledge; no matter how scientifically something is observed, it must still be described through use of
the categories of similarity and difference, import and meaning
with which we understand our world. 7 1

Childbirth itself is also seen as a dangerous, pathological, and
unpredictable medical event. The role of the physician during
labor is conceptualized, therefore, as imposing control and predictability on this process (and, hence, on the women through
whom it is played out)."7 Physicians "manage" the labor, performing various interventions to assure that it proceeds along the
lines of "normal" births, lines that are derived by averaging the
wide range of patterns that labor actually follows among different
women into a standardized set of "stages" with their own prescribed durations and symptomatology 73 In addition, successful
childbirth has increasingly become equated with only the produc170.

See MARTIN, supra note 163, at 45.

171. Id. at 10-11. Another example Martin uses to get this point across is the medical
description of conception. Traditionally depicted as a heroic act by a sperm that survives
a treacherous journey and eventually "burrows" its way into an inert egg, conception
could just as accurately be described (based on the observable behavior of the entities
involved) as an act of attack and envelopment of sperm by egg. Seeing the same movements, different observers could characterize them in widely different ways without misrepresenting their findings. Emily Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has
Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles, 17 SIGNS: J. WOMEN,
CULTURE, & Soc'Y 485 (1991); see also ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER

205-22 (1985) (discussing the social construction of science in general and medicine in
particular).

172. TODD, supra note 98, at 28.
173. ROTHMAN, supra note 158, at 39-41; THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK
COLLECrIVE, supra note 99, at 364.
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tion of a "perfect" product, a child free of infection or disabilities.
The closer a physician can get to eliminating all risk of such problems, the more likely it is that he will accomplish a "successful"
birth. A concern with risk elimination 74thus is also an integral part
of the medical model of reproduction.
As I will discuss more fully below, malpractice pressures probably exacerbate this preoccupation with minimizing risk to the fetus. However, I would argue that many societal attitudes-especially attitudes about the good mother---contribute to the prevalence
of this viewpoint as well. In particular, the emphasis on protecting
the fetus seems to be directly related to the notion of the selfless
mother. Protecting a fetus often entails imposing certain risks on
the woman carrying it; a Cesarean section, for example, is at least
twice. as likely as a vaginal birth to result in the death of the
Yet this risk becomes irrelevant if the cultural norm
mother.'
that she be willing to sacrifice anything and evprescribes
already
erything for her children (born or unborn). Given that norm, it is
easy for the doctor to either (1) assume that she is a good mother
and therefore not consider her preferences very much during labor, on the assumption that she would want to sacrifice for her
child, or (2) assume that she is a bad mother and therefore not
consider her preferences very much during labor, on the assumption that she has no right to have them respected. Either way, the
result is that the mother becomes a source of risks, rather than a
bearer of them.
As can be seen from this discussion, an entire constellation of
associations derives from the prevailing medical image of the re-

174. Nancy Rhoden, in her groundbreaking article on forced Cesarean sections, explains the "maximin" decision strategy that many obstetricians use. Rhoden, supra note
14, at 2017, 2021. "A maximin strategy focuses on the worst possible outcome in a situation of uncertainty (here, fetal death or damage), and takes action to prevent that outcome, regardless of the outcome's actual probability of occurrence." Id. at 2017; see also
Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Obstetric Training as a Rite of Passage, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY

Q. 288, 300-03 (1987) (describing how negative outcomes can attain exaggerated importance in physicians' minds and cause them to cling tenaciously to the accepted modes of
delivery). This strategy is consistent with the cultural preoccupation with medicine as a
mechanism for controlling nature (reproduction) and vanquishing disease.
175.

Compare F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 593 (19th ed.

1993) (citing a study concluding that the maternal death rate in C-sections is .022%) with
NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No.

82-2067, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH 16 (1981) (concluding that maternal death rate from
vaginal birth is .01%). But see infra note 268 (noting that other studies have concluded
that the maternal death rate from C-sections is four times that of vaginal birth).
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productive process. On the one hand, medicine is seen as a scientific endeavor in which nature is controlled through culture-through active intervention by physicians. On the other
hand, reproduction (and the women in whose bodies it occurs) is
seen as a pathological, disease-like condition-the object that must
be acted upon and controlled in order to eliminate danger. Thus,
the following dichotomies emerge:
Medicine
Reproduction
science
pathology, disease
control, management
lack of control, danger
I
nature
culture
subject/action
object/inaction
men
women
3. Challenges to the Medical Model of Reproduction. The
notion that physicians are merely engaging in an objective medical
assessment when they label certain mothers as bad is sustained by
the invisibility of alternative ways of thinking about reproduction,
women, and their bodies. As the following review of the challenges to the medical model of reproduction reveals, alternative approaches to reproduction have been rendered invisible by the
dualistic images that elevate medicine over those alternatives and
men over women. By reinforcing the notion that the unavailability
of such approaches is due to their inefficacy rather than to the
power of the medical establishment, the dualistic images have
served to perpetuate a system of reproduction in which (all) women are devalued and controlled by (elite) men.
In recent years, however, the medical model of reproduction
has come under sustained attack by a burgeoning (at the beginning, primarily white) women's health movement. 176 As a result
of the efforts of the National Women's Health Network, the Boston Women's Health Book Collective (authors of the well-known
Our Bodies, Ourselves), and others, the noninterventionist, womanoriented approach to birth that characterized the midwifery practices of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been revitalized. More recently, the Black Women's Health Project and other

176. For a general discussion of alternative models of birthing and their criticisms of
the medical model, see RAYMOND G. DEVRIEs, REGULATING BIRTH: MIDWIVES, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (1985); SULLIVAN & WEITZ, supra note 112; CHILDBIRTH: ALTERNATIVES TO MEDICAL CONTROL (Shelly Romalis ed., 1981) [hereinafter CHILDBIRTH].
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organizations have added their concern with preventing coercion
and with increasing outsider women's access to medical care to the
attack on the medical model. These developments have begun to
expose the contingency of the medical model of birthing and have
set the stage for a reinterpretation of the refusal of medical advice
as resistance to prevailing forms of social power. Implicit in these
attacks on the medical model have been two assertions: (1) that
medicine is a cultural construct, and (2) that medicine is a hegemonic discourse.
The challenges to the medical model have taken essentially
the same form as challenges to other sets of dualisms. As Frances
Olsen has noted, there are essentially three ways in which such
sets of opposing terms are usually criticized.'" First, one can argue that the dualisms unfairly stereotype members of the lowstatus group. That is, they are inaccurate: most white women are
not passive, most African-Americans are not lazy, and so on.
Those presenting a parallel challenge to the medical model claim
that it unfairly stigmatizes alternative birthing approaches as less
scientific or successful than traditional medicine. 178 Second, one
can argue that the dualisms elevate traits that are actually unenviable and socially destructive and disparage traits that are good and
valuable. Thus, for example, relational feminists have contended
that pure logic is not necessarily superior to intuitive understanding and that striving for self-sufficiency may be less laudable than
recognizing human interdependence, and race theorists have suggested that contextual facts and narrative are as powerful conceptual tools as abstract analytics. 79 In the reproductive context, this
criticism takes the form of an effort to elevate alternative birthing
strategies, arguing that they are actually better-both in terms of
quality of care and in terms of human fulfillment-than the traditional approach."8

177. See Olsen, supra note 40.
178. See infra subsection (I)(D)(3)(a).
179. E.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 20; John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65

S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Richard Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Mar J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudencefor the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991).
180. See infra subsections (I)(D)(3)(b)-(c).
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The third critique of Western dualisms, and the one that is
most important to my argument, alleges that the distinctions the
dualisms draw are themselves incoherent. That is, in any particular
instance, it will not be readily apparent whether an individual's
reaction to her circumstances is rational or emotional, active or
passive. What seems absolutely illogical to one person, for example, might indeed seem perfectly rational to another. Because of
this indeterminacy of meaning, the act of labelling conduct as one
or the other is facilitated by unstated (and perhaps unconscious)
assumptions that reflect and reinforce power disparities in soci181
ety.
In other words, the dualisms do not represent or identify
"real" differences in the world but rather serve as vehicles for the
deployment of social power. I mean two things by this assertion.
First, the power to decide what is rational (or whatever) and what
is not devolves upon those with power in the society at large.
Because their visions of the world are those most often conveyed
through societal institutions such as law, the media, and schools, it
is their interpretations of a particular incident that will seem most
"true.' '19 Second, that power to name, to interpret the world,
legitimates the position of the dominant group to which it belongs
as well as that group's oppression of others. The consistent application of the dominant terms of the dualisms to those in power
and the devalued terms to a variety of "others" reinforces negative
images of those others that then seem to justify their subordination.' 3 Relying on these insights, much of the critical feminist
and critical race theory scholarship in the last several years has
been directed at revealing the ways in which the dominant belief
system's interpretation of the world prevents judges from seeing
the behavior and concerns of women (of all colors) or people of
color (of both sexes) as rational, responsible, and legitimate.

181.

Olsen, supra note 40, at 10.

182. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J.WOMEN, CULTURE, & Soc'y 635, 638-39 (1983). For
a general discussion of the social construction of knowledge and the relation between
knowledge and power, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE:
SELEcTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 1972-1977, at 78,

78-108 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1972); MacKinnon, supra at
652-55; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1160-81

(1985).
183. None of this is conscious, of course.
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In the context of reproduction, the third critique is represented by the argument that reproduction is, like all areas of social
life, an arena of power, and that birthing practices must be understood not as either right or wrong, "safe" or "dangerous," but
rather as the means by which social power is enforced and reproduced. 1" It is to this and the other two forms of critique that I
now turn.
a. Social construction of the medical model.
Jimmy Carter was the first president of the United States to have
been born in a hospital."
The association of medicine with reason, facts, and objectivity
has been challenged through efforts to show that medicine is in
fact a product of culture, rather than separate and apart from
it-that it is socially constructed. These efforts have followed a
number of trajectories. Historians, for example, have examined the
development of obstetrics as a field of specialization during the
nineteenth century, noting that the rise of the medical profession
in general and obstetricians in particular occurred through the
exclusion of women from medical schools and the concomitant
stigmatization of female health care providers, particularly midwives." This development occurred even though at the time
midwives were actually providing safer and more effective care
than physicians.Y Moreover, an examination of the changing
rules of thumb applied to women's reproductive and parenting
behavior over the years reveals that those rules have been based
as much on stereotyped images of women as on physicians' "objective" assessments of their patients' needs."
In the areas of childbirth and infant health, the rules of
thumb have changed with startling rapidity. Just a generation ago,
numerous behaviors and procedures were recommended that are
now considered harmful. To list just a few, women were told to:
(1) stringently limit weight gain during pregnancy, now considered

184. See infra subsection I(D)(3).
185. ROTHMAN, supra note 158, at 29.
186. See EHRENREICH, supra note 152, at 62-88 (discussing the rise of physicians and
the exclusion of midwives); ROTHMAN, supra note 158, at 50-63 (same).
187. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHEs, MIDWIVES, AM NuRSFs: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 23-24, 34 (1973).
188. EHRENREICH, supra note 152, at 190-239.
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very dangerous to the fetus;189 (2) feed infants on rigid feeding
schedules, now considered unnecessary, if not cruel; (3) use infant
formula, rather than breast milk, despite the latter's natural antibodies and freedom from contamination;19 (4) take diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriage, although it was carcinogenic
and useless as a miscarriage-preventative;. 9 ' (5) ease labor with
pain-relieving medicines that drugged their babies; and (6) accept
elective induction of labor (through physician rupturing of the
membranes), which can result in stronger contractions that damage
infants' skulls, cut off infants' oxygen supply, and rupture women's
uteri."9 The definition of "failure to progress," one of the most
common "indicators" for a Cesarean,"9 also has changed over
the years; a woman is now allowed to labor less time before she
will be so labelled. 94 Similarly, the accepted medical practice of
prohibiting a woman who has undergone one C-section from delivering vaginally has now been nearly universally condemned. 9 '
These numerous and significant changes in conventional medical wisdom are not simply part of some inevitable, progressive
process of improvement in medical knowledge. Many of the changes, including, for example, the recent increased awareness of the
overuse of Cesareans, came about as the result of pressure exerted
by the women's health movement and proponents of alternative
birthing practices." 6 Furthermore, analysts have tied such changes in medical "truths" to changes in societal images of women."9

189. SULLIVAN & WEITZ, supra note 112, at 34. Adequate maternal weight gain could
decrease infant mortality by as much as 59%. Id.
190. Id. at 33.
191. See generally Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980) (discussing the use of DES as a miscarriage preventative and the resulting cancerous effects
on daughters exposed to it bWfore birth), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
192. SULLIVAN & WErrz, supra note 112, at 32.
193. According to a leading textbook on obstetrics, 31% of the Cesarean sections performed in 1985 were due to dystocia, the "abnormally slow progress of labor."
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 175, at 592. The 1985 rate of C-sections due to dystocia (7.6 per 100 births) represented an increase of nearly one third over the 1980 rate
(4.8 per 100). Id.

194. Rhoden, supra note 14, at 2017-21.
195. See Warren E. Leary, Birth Experts Caution on Repeated Caesareans,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1988, at B16. In 1985, repeat C-sections accounted for 36% of the surgeries.
CUNNINGHAM ETIAL., supra note 165, at 442.

196. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 99, at 386 (listing
Cesarean prevention organizations and noting that they have had an impact on hospital
practices).
197. See generally EHRENREICH, supra note 152. As Ehrenreich points out, for exam-
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This historical work has highlighted the fact that medicine is a
social construct. By identifying the cultural content of medical
verities of a hundred, fifty, or even ten years ago, critics raise
questions about the "truth" of those espoused today. In revealing
that medical knowledge is socially constructed, they also draw
attention to the particular ideological messages-that women's
bodies are impure and need to be controlled, that white women
are weak and black women irresponsible, and so on-that produce
and legitimate that knowledge.' 98
In addition to writing historical accounts, critics of modem
medicine have directly attacked the way in which obstetricians
"manage" women's pregnancies today.'99 The use of Cesarean
sections is particularly vulnerable to criticism, for this surgery is
performed with more frequency in the Uhited States than in almost any other industrialized nation. In less than twenty years,
the rate of Cesareans performed in this country more than quadrupled, bounding from 5.5% of births in 1970 to 23.8% in 1989."°
Other nations manage to do the surgery much less frequently
while maintaining comparable (or even lower) maternal and infant
mortality and morbidity rates.2"2
pie, in the nineteenth century, the rise of diagnoses of hysteria and other "female" maladies corresponded to the development of the romantic ideal of women as frail, sickly,
and irrational, id.at 91-126, and in the mid-twentieth century, doctors' views of children
as needing permissiveness directly corresponded to their perceptions of women as instinctively and ecstatically nurturing. Id.at 190-239.
198. That is, once it appears that medical views are the product of culture, the next
question to be answered naturally becomes: What accounts for those views? If medical
practices are not based on science, on what are they based? These questions in turn
focus attention on the ideological content of medical verities.
199. The term "manage" itself has come under criticism as implying that the physician
is the active, human component of the process and the woman is the passive object
being managed. See MARTIN, supra note 163, at 54-67 (arguing that reproduction is understood through industrial images, with the laboring woman seen as a machine and the
physician as a foreman).
200. See Finer, supra note 15, at 275; Norma I. Gavin et al., Cesarean Section in
North Carolina: The Need for Review, 51 N.C. MED. J. 81 (1990) (study of Cesarean
section rates); Janet Bass, Number of Cesarean Deliveries Leveling Off, UPI, July 11,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Monroe, supra note 112, § 1, at 3.
201. Finer, supra note 15, at 275; Stephen A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, Letter to the
Editor, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED 200, 200 tbl. 1 (1990); Bass, supra note 200. The World
Health Organization states that there is "no justification for a rate above 10 to 15 percent." SULLIVAN & WEITz, supra note 112, at 36 (citing WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, APPROPRIATE TCHNOLOGY FOR BIRTH 437 (1988)).
202. According to one study of 19 industrialized countries, "with the exception of
Canada and Australia, the U.S. rate was 50 to 200 percent higher than that of other

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:492

In criticizing the medical "management" of labor and birth,
the white women's health movement has argued that the various
medical interventions thought to facilitate a safe delivery often create a snowball effect: the initial intervention interferes with the
progress of the labor, making additional interventions seem necessary, until eventually the labor becomes so compromised that a
Cesarean section is indicated. For example, there is evidence that
a labor will be shorter and less difficult if the woman continues
walking around as much as possible, yet routine use of fetal monitors prevents her from doing so.' This lack of mobility, along
with the supine (lithotomy) position in which many hospitals and
physicians expect women to deliver, can thus actually contribute to
a problem that tends to be perceived as emanating from the
woman's body itself. If the drug Pitocin is administered to accelerate the "sluggish" labor, the pain of the contractions can become
so great that the woman requires epidural anaesthesia, which, if
not administered in the amount that is exactly right for her body
(something that is difficult to know in advance), can produce such
numbness that she no longer feels the contractions. Unable to feel
her lower body, she may have difficulty pushing the fetus out,
stalling the labor yet again. Moreover, her prone position can put
more pressure on blood vessels that supply oxygen to the fetus,
resulting in distress readings on the monitor. Eventually, as a result of all of these developments, a Cesarean section might seem
necessary. Had the doctors instead left well enough alone, alternative health providers argue, the woman would usually have succeeded on her own.2 '

countries." Francis C. Notzon et al., Comparisons of National Cesarean-Section Rates, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 386, 386 (1987). There is some indication that mortality rates actually
decrease when C-section rates go down. See Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 514 n.139.
203. Fetal monitors, unfortunately, are often unreliable. See infra note 265.
204. On the effects of common medical interventions in labor, see generally RICH,
supra note 10, at 177-78; SULLIVAN & WErTz, supra note 112, at 32; BOSTON WOMEN'S
HEALTH BOOK COLLECrIVE, supra note 99, at 379-89; Rhoden, supra note 14, at
2017-21. My point in describing this chain of events is not necessarily to endorse the
alternative model of birthing, although I personally find it both appealing and convincing.
I am not a physician, and my purpose is not to "prove" that one view of childbirth is
right and the other is wrong. Rather, I wish to impress on the reader that there are at
least two visions of how childbirth can and should occur and that each of those visions is
supported by competent, committed, and concerned health practitioners. In short, there is
more than one acceptable way to birth a baby. For a discussion of infant and maternal
mortality rates from home and hospital births, see SULLIVAN & WErrZ, supra note 112,
at 112-32.
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In addition to the race and sex biases already discussed, critics
also have noted various attitudinal factors that affect physician
behavior. 5 Fear of malpractice liability, for example, accounts
for the routine use of fetal monitors, which are wrong as often as
they are right,2°6 and is the single largest reason for physicians'
performance of Cesarean sections.2" In addition, as mentioned
earlier, the anti-risk ethic of modern American medicine
creates an institutionalized value choice in favor of risk-averseness-a
choice that masquerades as neutral, "medical" judgment. Both the
fear of liability and the risk-elimination goal encourage more,
rather than fewer, interventions as physicians strive "manfully" to
control the (dangerous) reproductive process, to dominate nature
with culture.
b.

The "alternative" model of reproduction.

At this point the woman, nearly sapped of all energy, must rally
her reserves to begin pushing the baby out .... [The] woman
turns to the nearest figure of authority with beseeching eyes and
a look on her face that no one who has ever attended a delivery
will ever forget. It is a look of shock and disbelief, a statement
all its own that woman is never so completely and totally alone
than at this moment. [It is a] ...cry for help, which looks like
terror to the uninitiated .... When primitive woman turned to
the midwife with that same look of desperation, the midwife
rightfully interpreted the plea to mean "Assist me," "Support
me," "Tell me this is supposed to happen." The obstetrician
reads it as a cry to "Stop it," "Intervene," "Do it for me."
Drawing on the experiences of midwives, especially those who
attend home births, proponents of alternative birthing practices

205. See supra subsection I(C)(2).
206.

Rhoden, supra note 14, at 2013-17. Anecdotal evidence of the self-protective use

of monitors exists as well: an obstetrician recently told me that most doctors know the
monitors are unreliable but use them out of fear that, should anything go wrong, they
will be held liable if they did not do so.
207.

Wenda B. O'Reilly et al., Childbirth and the Malpractice Insurance Industry, in

THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH 196, 199 (Pamela S.Eakins ed., 1986); see also Lee A.
Schott, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm Prosecution or Prevention?, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 227, 243 n.92 (1988) (noting physicians' erroneous impression that
poor women bring more malpractice suits).
208. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
209.

SuZANNE ARMs, IMMACULATE DECEPTION: A NEW LOOK AT WOMEN AND

CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 125-26 (1975).
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perceive a very different "truth" about what happens during pregnancy and delivery from that which mainstream medicine espouses.
These proponents challenge mainstream depictions of birthing by
suggesting that alternative methods are in fact more effective and
humane.
There is no denying that this view of the reality of what happens in childbirth is as socially constructed as the view it means to
supplant; But the mere presence of a coherent alternative to modem medicine casts doubt upon the convictions that drive society
and the courts into accepting and enforcing one view of reproduction. Furthermore, the socially contingent nature of the alternative
model does not diminish and in fact supports the decision of women who, for reasons other than "truth," prefer to use that approach.10
The alternative model21 ' of reproduction views childbirth as
a normal physiological process that cannot be completely controlled, yet only rarely is harmful 12 It also sees labor and delivery as something extraordinarily difficult but also extraordinarily
fulfilling-more akin to climbing a mountain than suffering a
stroke.
Suzanne Arms perhaps most eloquently captures the
difference between these two visions of birthing in her description
of the painful transition stage of labor.1 4

210. See infra subsection (I)(D)(3)(c).
211. Alternative approaches to the medical model of reproduction have actually taken
a number of specific forms over the years. See RicH, supra note 10, at 171-74. Moreover, there are important differences between the way in which lay midwives, who have
no institutionalized medical training, and nurse midwives, who are also nurses, practice.

Nevertheless, for my purposes, it is sufficient to present a composite picture that relates
the general themes common to most approaches. I freely admit that it ignores a number
of differences among them. For a general discussion of midwifery, see SULLIVAN &
WErrZ, supra note 112.
212. Although I am more concerned with the images associated with this alternative

vision of childbirth than with its utility, I should reiterate that it has not been proven to
be less effective, or more dangerous, than the medical model. Research on infant and

maternal mortality and morbidity rates for hospital and home births at best indicates that
home births are slightly safer and at worst is inconclusive. See SULLIVAN & WErrZ, supra
note 112, at 112-32.
213. As I write this, however, I cannot help wondering whether some would argue

that even suffering a stroke is not only debilitating and difficult but strengthening and
broadening as well, if approached with the right attitude. For a personal narrative on the
social challenges people with disabilities face, see Ynestra King, The Other Body: Reflec-

tions on Difference, Disability, and Identity Politics, 3 Ms., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 72.
214.

See supra text accompanying note 209. This is an apt description, despite her un-

fortunate use of the word "primitive."
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Thus, the first precept of the alternative approach to childbirth is the notion that pain is not pathological, not something to
be feared, and the conviction that women have the strength to endure it. In short, this approach rejects stereotypes of women as
either weak and vulnerable or as dangerously irresponsible or
hysterically out of control and instead affirms their strength and
determination in the face of adversity.215
A second aspect is that midwives do not view completely
controlling the birthing process as their goal. Recognizing the
"snowball" effect that technological interventions can have on
labor, they see the medical search for such control as having the
potential to actually increase, rather than minimize, risk. Moreover,
since they see birthing not as an event that happens to a woman
but rather as an activity that she engages in, midwives believe that
the best way to ensure a good result is to facilitate the control of
the process by the woman herself. Thus, this alternative model accepts the inevitability of the health professional's lack of ultimate
control over
the process; it eschews efforts to control nature com216
pletely.
Third, proponents of the alternative m6def have a strong
commitment to patient participation in the decisionmaking process.
Midwives encourage, indeed require, their patients to take responsibility for their pregnancies and deliveries, emphasizing that it is
up to them to get the exercise and diet they need and to make
most of the decisions about the course of labor and delivery.217
This approach thus rejects the notion of a hierarchical relationship

.215. In fact, this approach has been criticized, rightly in my opinion, for sometimes
going too far in its belief in the necessity of pain. Although the pain might be unavoidable and overcoming it might give one a real sense of accomplishment, it is important not to begin to see it as desirable, purifying, or good.
I wish I could say that alternative birthing methods also reject the stereotype of
outsider women as super-strong and recognize their vulnerability and need for support. I
know, however, few alternative birthing materials that evince any awareness of race or
class differences among women. But cf. BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTrIVE,

supra note 99, at 79, 102, 559-60 (mentioning effect of environmental toxins on people of
color and impact of stereotypes of women of color and low-income women on their
treatment by the medical and legal systems).
216. See ROTHMAN, supra note 158, at 248-55 (contrasting the midwifery model's
emphasis on control by the birthing womin herself with the medical model's emphasis on
physician and technological control).
217. A patient delivering with a midwife would probably not say, as did the woman
quoted in the Introduction, that the midwife had "allowed" her to fly to a convention.
She would know that it was she herself who had made that decision.
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between health care provider and patient, in which the provider
possesses a body of expert knowledge and therefore is usually in a
better position to know what is best for the patient.
By now, it should be clear that the perspective of midwives
and those who use their services reflects a commitment to all
those things that the dualisms associated with medicine exist in
contrast to and therefore devalue. The difference, however, is that
the alternative model of reproduction rejects the hierarchization of
those sets of dualisms, replacing the deprecatory terms usually
used to define what is not-medicine with positive terms.
Obstetrics/Medicine
Non-Science
Midwifery
science, technical
superstition,
experience, conknowledge
ignorance
textual knowledge
reason
instinct, emotion
reason and selfperception
facts
values
facts and values
neutrality, objectivity
bias, subjectivity
connection,
cooperation
culture
nature
nature
(control of nature)
(needing control)
(respected, but not
controlled)
maleness (physicians)
femaleness (patients) femaleness
(midwives218 and
patients)
control, order
chaos, disorder
inevitable
uncertainty (confidence, courage)
To the proponents of alternative birthing approaches, the column
on the right, rather than the middle column, more accurately depicts the birthing process.
My point, however, in describing this alternative vision of
childbirth is not to argue that it represents the true, correct understanding of human reproduction. Rather, I am asserting that
218. There is an interesting class component to the disparagement of
ditional ideology. Although midwives provide only 2% of the nation's
50% of their services are for the poor. O'Reilly et al., supra note 207,
valuation of this particular type of health care also is likely tied to the
mary consumers are themselves devalued citizens.

midwives in traobstetrical care,
at 206. The defact that its pri-
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this vision is at least as correct, or as incorrect, as the medical
model. I take this position not only because of substantial evidence that maternal and fetal morbidity and mortality are comparable under the two approaches21 9 but also out of a conviction
that because science is a cultural construct, there can be no incontrovertibly "right" scientific view. The possibility that there might
be two equally effective approaches' to birthing raises the questions of how we might choose between them and of why this society has so strongly favored one over the other. To answer those
questions, however, it is necessary to attend to the issue of power.
c. Birthing as an arena of social power and resistance.
Doctor-female patient relationships... can be considered a
struggle for definition and control of the essential feminine nature.01
[If feminists argue that] all scientific statements are historical
fictions made facts through the exercise of power [there will be]
trouble when [they] want to talk about producing feminist science
which is more true. "
From the perspective of the rewriting of the dualisms given
above, the alternative approach to childbirth is revolutionary.
It challenges fundamental beliefs and firmly entrenched distributions of power, raising questions about what constitutes male and
female, science and superstition, order and chaos. Thus, efforts to
employ this alternative approach can be seen as acts of resistance
to the dominant order, acts informed by an alternative set of understandings of the world that medicine purports to know.Y Analyses that view the reproductive realm as one of social struggle, in which discourses about female bodies and reproductive

219. See supra note 212.
220. Measurements of effectiveness depend to some degree, of course, on the criteria
of effectiveness used.

221. Shelly Romalis, Natural Childbirth and the Reluctant Physician, in CHILDBIRTH,
supra note 176, at 63, 81.
222. Donna . Haraway, In the Beginning Was the Word: The Genesis of Biological
Theory, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN, CULTURE, & Soc'Y 469, 478 (1981).

223. See supra text accompanying note 218.
224. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 182, at 78-108 (describing his conception of
the insurrection of subjugated knowledges).
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processes function either to legitimate and perpetuate or to challenge and undermine exercises of social power, constitute the third
type of critique of the dualisms associated with medicine.' From
the perspective of this critique, both the coercion directed at outsider women and the more subtle control of privileged women are
seen as techniques for exerting power and preventing resistance to
the medicolegal model of reproduction.
For privileged women, the "discovery" of alternative approaches to the birthing process has facilitated the development of
the notion that reproduction is an arena of struggle over social
meanings and social power. Once it becomes apparent that the
medical model is no more "true" or "right" than the midwifery
model, the choice between them is revealed as less a matter of
logic than of preference. In other words, if efficacy is not what
makes the medical model so appealing, one has to ask what does.
Whose interests does that model serve? Whose does it not serve?
Asking such questions has led privileged women writers to see disagreements about how women should birth children as covert
struggles over who should control reproduction and what the proper roles of women as mothers should be. It also has led some
people to prefer the alternative model of reproduction, not because it is more "true" but rather because it does not disparage or
disempower women yet produces good results.' s
In contrast, writings and reform efforts by African-American
women suggest that they (and perhaps other women of color as
well) did not need to discover alternative birthing approaches to
recognize the social power at work in the reproductive arena. Such
women's analyses of and efforts to improve their experience of
reproduction and childbirth have of course reflected the position in
which they find themselves. Because they have been so frequently
subjected to coercive interventions in their reproductive lives, and
because they have so often been denied access to the routine

225. Central to such a critique, as I will present it, is a critical examination of the
gender-based dualisms that medical decisions both reflect and reinforce.
226. Some authors who espouse alternative approaches to birthing do so out of the
recognition that all approaches are socially constructed. For these writers, rejection of the
medical model seems to stem as much from political preferences as from a belief that
the alternative picture of reproduction is more "true." See, e.g., RiCH, supra note 10, at
182 ("To change the experience of childbirth means to change women's relationship to
fear and powerlessness, to our bodies, to our children; it has far-reaching psychic and
political implications.").
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prenatal and other health care that most privileged women enjoy,
their concerns are not articulated in terms of limiting unwanted
medical attention and making childbirth a safer and less alienating
experience. Rather, they are more immediately concerned with
getting access to needed medical treatment and avoiding coercive

interference with their efforts to reproduce. 27 As Dorothy Roberts has noted, poor black women's "major concern is not having
an ethical conflict with their doctor, but affording or finding a
doctor in the first place."'

Often faced with insufficient funds to care for the children
they want, black women have not seen the right to have an abortion as an especially valuable right. Plagued by attacks on their
physical safety in the form of forced sterilizations 9 and guineapig surgeries, z0 they have not been particularly concerned with
assuring that their labors are fulfilling, empowering experiences.
Denied routine access to the medical care they need to ensure
their health and that of their children, 1 they have not worried

227. See generally THE BLACK WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK, supra note 97 (presenting a
wide range of essays on black women's health problems and concerns); THE COMMITTEE
FOR ABORTION RIGHTS AND AGAINST STERILIZATION ABUSE, WOMEN UNDER ATrACIc

VICTORIES, BACKLASH AND THE FIGHT FOR REPRODUCrIVE FREEDOM (Susan E. Davis
ed., 1988) (noting importance of focusing not just on abortion but also on black women's
health concerns, such as sterilization); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 74 (same); Rutherford,
supra note 74 (same).
228. Roberts, supra note 20, at 1458.
229. See supra dotes 73-75 and accompanying text.
230. As recently as the 1970s, residents were reporting that low-income women were
subjected to unnecessary hysterectomies in order to give practice to the obstetrics residents. deMaehl & Thurston, supra note 118, at 17; see also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
231. Infant mortality rates for infants of color are disproportionately high. A 1982
study, for example, found that black infants die at nearly twice the rate of white infants.
See Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 74, at 38 n.73 (citing 6 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM.
SERVS., REPORT OF SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH 55

(1985)). According to Nsiah-Jefferson, although the data are incomplete, there are strong
indications that virtually every minority group in the United States, with the exception of
Asians who are not Southeast Asians, has a significantly higher infant mortality rate than
whites. Id. at 38.
Infant mortality is strongly associated with lack of access to prenatal care. "[B]abies
born to mothers receiving no prenatal care are three times more likely to die in infancy
than those whose mothers do receive such care." Angela Y. Davis, Sick and Tired of
Being Sick and Tired. The Politics of Black Womens Health, in THE BLACK WOMEN'S
HEALTH BOOK, supra note 97, at 18, 21. Women of color have less access to prenatal
care than white women. African-American women, for example, are twice as likely as
white women to receive late or no prenatal care. Rutherford, supra note 74, at 260.
Moreover, lack of prenatal care affects maternal mortality as well as infant mortality.
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about whether doctors might be overprescribing the latest technology to them. Openly dismissed and disparaged,"2 they have
felt less need to object to patronizing tones, overprotectiveness, or
inadequate communication techniques.' In short, to them, the
treatment they receive in the reproductive realm represents a
violent effort at subjugation (if not elimination) of the group to
which they belong-an effort that has as much, if not more, to do
with race (and therefore, inevitably, class) as with gender.'
However, whether one focuses on outsider women's struggles
for survival against open coercion and violence or on privileged
women's acquiescence in a demeaning and disempowering conceptualization of their social role, refusals to accede to doctors' orders
take on a new light when birthing is seen as the site of struggle
and resistance. In this subsection, therefore, I will argue that
women's refusals of Cesarean sections can be seen as acts of resistance against the dominant images of themselves, medicine, and
reproduction outlined thus far. Rather than suggesting disregard

In 1986 .... women of color were 3.3 times more likely than white women to
die from pregnancy-related causes. The leading causes for these maternal deaths
are considered "preventable or probably preventable through routine medical
care before pregnancy, early and continuous prenatal care, risk appropriate
delivery procedures, and routine care after birth."
Id. (quoting CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 10
(1989)).
232. See generally SCULLY, supra note 119 (describing how attitudes toward women
patients are conveyed through obstetrics and gynecology training); TODD, supra note 98,
at 169-77 (describing gynecologists' attitudes toward their patients).
233. Of course, they are not unconcerned with such treatment but merely see it as
less important than the more pressing issues of access and economic survival.
[Mqany white feminists feel patriarchy has subjugated both nature and women,
and that nature too must be reclaimed from oppression. Women of color, on
the other hand, don't have the luxury of making this their cause: they must
battle the economic, social, political and racial-ethnic oppressions that daily
threaten their very existence and that of their families.
Prathia H. Wynn, Toward a New Starting-Point,8 WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS 25, 26 (1991)
(reviewing SUSAN THISTLErHWAITE, SEX, RACE AND GOD: CHRISTIAN FEMINISM IN
BLACK AND WHITE (1989)).
234. Because white women have been generally inattentive to these concerns of women of color, the women's health movement has been largely a segregated affair. Only
very recently have white women active in that movement become aware of the concerns
of their sisters and the conditions that have generated those concerns. Nevertheless, this
split
may have caused some women of color to disparage the concerns of the white
women's health movement as trivial and self-indulgent and to underestimate the extent to
which more medical attention does not necessarily mean better medical treatment. Neither side, in other words, realizes that the two sets of circumstances are interrelated and
mutually reinforcing. It is that very lack of awareness and understanding, I will argue,
that allows both groups' oppression to continue. See infra subsection III(C)(2).
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for the well-being of one's offspring, those refusals might instead
suggest rejection of a demeaning vision of one's self and one's
body and a claiming of one's right to human dignity, respect, and
autonomy. This resistance need not necessarily be conscious, although it might be for some. Nor is it always recognized as resistance, for the (perceived) 235 race and economic class of the woman resisting will significantly affect whether her behavior is recognized as such. 6 When it is recognized, however-and the recognition of resistance also can be either conscious or unconscious-it
is likely to be suppressed with naked power.
In refusing a Cesarean section, a woman is resisting a patriarchal view of herself and her role in reproduction. A high-income
white woman who rejects the medical model of childbirth is resisting a vision of herself as an object to be "managed," as passive,
incompetent, selfless, and emotional. Moreover, she is resisting an
image of the reproductive process as a pathological, flawed undertaking fraught with danger, and of her own body as incompetent,
threatening, and out of control. A low-income woman of color
who refuses a C-section is rejecting not only the notion that her
body is dangerous but also an image of herself as stupid, irresponsible, and selfish and as impervious to pain, discomfort, or inconvenience. Moreover, she is also engaging in an act of self-preservation, challenging the very profession that has so often hurt women
like her before. In a profound way, she is claiming her humanity
and fighting for her survival.
Refusal of a Cesarean not only challenges applicable gender
categories but also violates the prevailing norm of obedience to
medical authority. Consider, in this regard, the story of Marlene
Harris, one of the mothers described by Anna Tsing in her study
of unassisted births. A 25-year-old white woman who worked as a
maid in a rural town, Harris knew she was pregnant and planned
to give the child up for adoption but was very anxious about going

235. I emphasize perceptions because they are most important. The individual's perceived race or class, rather than her actual race or class, is what determines her treatment. See Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and
the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990); Tsing, supra note 13, at 294 (arguing
that the perceived class status of a woman who has birthed her child without assistance
determines whether she is seen as irretrievably bad or as an innocent gone astray).
236. Susan Irwin and Brigitte Jordan, in a study of nine court-ordered C-section cases,
reported that middle-class women resist Cesarean interventions more successfully than
outsider women. See Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 328.
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to the hospital to give birth. A friend of hers had told Harris that,
when the friend had birthed in a hospital, the hospital personnel
had taken the child away without even letting her see or hold it.
Harris was afraid the same thing would happen to her. On the
night she went into labor, although she had planned to go to the
hospital, she drove past it instead and checked into a motel. After
delivering the baby on the motel bed, she became weak and cold
from loss of blood and crawled into a warm bath with her child.
When she lost consciousness in the tub, the baby drowned. 7
In both newspaper accounts and interviews of law enforcement personnel, Tsing reports, Harris was "described as devious
and a liar. Moreover, while she was derided for having 'average'
or lower intelligence

. . .

, her ignorance was endowed with a kind

of animal cunning that looked out for self-survival at any moral
expense."' 38 Tsing notes that public sentiment that any "reasonable" woman would have gone to the hospital was so strong that
people were simply incapable of hearing Harris's fears about the
hospital as legitimate. 9 For the death of her child, Harris was
sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.2'
The aversion to traditional medical treatment revealed in
Harris's behavior is not uncommon. For example, race and class
differences often deter poor women of color from seeking prenatal
treatment.241 One Haitian woman explained her reactions to the
treatment she received as follows:
My friend say go to doctor and get checked ....My friend

be on the phone much time before they make appointment. They
no have space for 30 days.
When I go to hospital, it confusing ....I go early, and see
doctor late in the afternoon ....I wait on many long lines and

take lots of tests. I no understand why so many test every time.
No one explain nothing. No one talk my language. I be tired,
feel sick from hospital. I go three times, but no more. Too much
trouble for nothing.2 42
237. Tsing, supra note 13, at 291-92.
238. Id. at 292.
239. Id. at 293.
240. Id. at 291.
241. See, eg., Roberts, supra note 20, at 1447 n.144 (noting that "institutional, cultural,
and educational" barriers prevent women from obtaining proper care).
242. FRANcis G. CARO ET AL, BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE 75-76 (1988). This
quote is striking to me in the tone of powerlessness it conveys. This woman is keenly
aware of the disrespect and inconvenience to which she is being subjected, yet she is also
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Given the harm that the disrespect and inattention to which they
are often subjected in the medical setting has caused these women,
their avoidance of medical solutions could even be seen as a rational act of self-preservation.243
Since medical authority is itself constituted as male authority,
and since (valued) femaleness is defined in part as obedience to
males,2' the resistance of these women is thus a double sin: they
are rebelling against not only medicine but patriarchy as well. The
race, gender, and class implications of their behavior, however,
tend to be obscured by the "neutral" image of science. Thus, judges accept unquestioningly doctors' assessments of these situations,2 45 forgetting that the vast majority of physicians are privileged white males2' and ignorant of the critiques of medical truisms generated by feminist scientists and women's health movements. As a result, they are unable to see the relationship between
doctor and patient as an arena of social struggle. In contrast, when
viewed with a different set of lenses, the battles in the delivery
room appear clearly as battles between the sexes, as well as battles
of race and class. To the physicians and their legal counterparts,
however, a woman's refusal to obey her doctor's orders seems

just as keenly aware of the impossibility of changing that treatment. Her only viable
option is avoidance.
Todd reveals another strategy women follow in their attempts to manipulate a
system that is fundamentally unresponsive to them-lying. She tells the story of "Sally
Barrett," a woman in her mid-thirties who, possibly because she had had one abortion,
was strongly urged by her physician to continue using oral contraceptives. Although because of side effects and health concerns she preferred a diaphragm instead, she was
unable to even talk to the doctor about that alternative. "He's been after me to take,
[the Pill] for a while," she said, "and every time that I say no, he just looks at me." So
Ms. Barrett lied to her doctor, telling him she was still on the Pill, and switched to the
diaphragm on her own. TODD, supra note 98, at 92-93.
243. After all, many individuals might prefer to risk physiological harm to themselves
or their children, rather than have to deal with the profound psychological damage
dismissive and dehumanizing treatment causes.
244. I do mean males, unmodified. As the infamous Moynihan Report illustrates,
white male society expects women of color to be submissive not only to white men but
to men of their own race as well. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (suggesting that black
women's dominance over their men accounts for the "breakup" of the black family). For
critiques of the racism and sexism in the Moynlhan Report, see GIDDINGS, supra note
53, at 324-35, Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 163-65.
245. See Kolder, et al., supra note 14 (reporting that courts usually grant requests for
orders of coercive obstetrical treatment).
246. SULLIVAN & WErIZ, supra note 112, at 42.
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instead like an unconscionably selfish and mystifyingly irrational
rejection of science.
4. In re Madyun Fetus as an Example.
Cesarean sections are so much a part of the standard, legitimized form of birthing that refusing to submit to one marks a
woman as rejecting legitimate medical advice .... She will not
be seen as the victim of the structural distribution of power and
authority, as someone resisting the symbolic violence of the
transaction.247
A reexamination of the Madyun case 248 illustrates how the
acceptance of physicians' statements as "truth" facilitates the labeling of outsider women as bad mothers, and how the acceptance of
negative images about those women supports the conclusion that
physicians' statements are "true." Not only does the courts' unquestioning acceptance of medical judgments foreclose any recognition that outsider women might have legitimate reasons for resisting medical authority but also the stereotype of such women as
bad confirms the "expertise" of physicians in the role of identifying such badness. That is, because they label as bad those who
are generally thought to be bad, their assessments seem correct.
The medical testimony gains credence also by presenting the
medical model of the birthing process as the only legitimate view,
thereby delegitimizing other approaches by associating them with
the right side of the pairs of dualisms previously discussed: women,
superstition, quackery, and so on. This dualistic vision, in which
there is one right way to birth a child and all other ways are
wrong, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the doctors' way
must be the right one. However, an inquiry into the reasons the
physicians in the Madyun case cited for prescribing a C-section
shows that, if one is willing to concede that there might be two
different but equally valid approaches to birthing, it is possible to
recognize the viability of the Madyuns' position and hence to
challenge the characterization of them as bad.
As noted above, Ayesha Madyun, a young black Muslim
woman having her first child, was forced to have a Cesarean section after Judge Levie of the D.C. Superior Court authorized the

247. Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 328.
248. For a discussion of Madyun, see supra subsection I(C)(3).
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surgery. Ms. Madyun later described the experience as "a nightmare," stating, "I felt overpowered. I felt they were dominating
'
me. I felt I was being raped."249
Three years after the operation,
she still believed that it had been unnecessary." The physician
who testified in Ms. Madyun's case, however, saw the situation
quite differently, later implying that what the Madyuns had wanted
to do was "medically inappropriate" and describing their opposition to Cesarean surgery as "rather ridiculous."'"
It had been sixty hours since Madyun's amniotic sac had ruptured when the physicians at D.C. General Hospital asked the
court to order a C-section. Ms. Madyun and her husband had refused to consent to the procedure, maintaining that it was unnecessary. A medical resident, Dr. John C. Cumming,' testified at
the hearing. In his testimony, he explicitly characterized Madyun's
labor as aberrational, stating that "normal" labor lasts ten to fifteen hours and that "normal obstetrical procedures" call for a
birth to be completed within 24 hours of rupture of the amniotic
sac. Emphasizing that such "abnormality" presented a danger to
the fetus, Cumming further testified that failure to adhere to the
established procedures increased the risk of infection, which could
ultimately be fatal to the child. The physician testified also that
symptoms of sepsis (infection) included "maternal temperature,
foul smelling discharge, and fetal heartbeat." Ms. Madyun's "slightly elevated" temperature was the only symptom that had been
noted. However, the doctor testified that sepsis also could set in
and proceed to a dangerous level with little or no warning. Thus,
he concluded, the risk of fetal infection was between 50%' and
75%, whereas "the risk to Mrs. Madyun of undergoing a Caesarean section was said to be 0.25%."'2 3

In his opinion (at two pages, an unusually lengthy and
thoughtful opinion for decisions in such cases),' Judge Levie

249.
250.

Jost, supra note 15, at 84.
Id.

251. Id.
252. The resident's name is spelled "Cummings" in the court's opinion and
"Cumming" in a subsequent article on the case. See id. at 84. I am assuming that given
the time constraints under which the court was operating, the article is more likely to
have used the correct spelling.
253. In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, 2233, 2239 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1986).
254. As one commentator noted,
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made it clear that he viewed the Madyuns' position that the surgery was unnecessary as unfounded. 'In describing the couple's
reasons for saying that a C-section was unnecessary, he emphasized at every turn that those were merely beliefs, not the reality
of the situation. 5 In contrast, the judge unquestioningly accepted the doctor's conclusions, relating the "risks" posed by foregoing
the surgery as statements of fact, rather than as statements of
medical opinion. Accepting the medical vision of reproduction as a
pathological process, Judge Levie treated nature (i.e., childbirth) as
a dangerous and unpredictable force that needed to be controlled
by the physicians. To him, the Madyuns, in trying to face it on
their own, unprotected by experts, were playing with fire.
Now, at first blush, the judge's stance is probably not surprising. After all, courts frequently rely on scientific statements about
the world in reaching their decisions, and medical science is generally accepted as providing reliable information about our bodies.
On second glance, however, the degree of deference given to this
individual doctor is rather startling. Given the time constraints
under which the hearing was conducted and the absence of opposing expert testimony-or even the opportunity to obtain that testimony-the physician's statements arguably should not have been
given even the usual credence accorded to professional witnesses.

25 6

Levie's two-page written opinion is exceptional for its length. More typical is
the four-sentence memorandum by Circuit Court Judge James L. Sanders of St.
Louis in a May 1987 case. Citing no statutory or case authorities, Sanders simply declared, "The intrusion involved in [the mother's] life ... is outweighed
by the duty of the State to protect a living unborn human being from meeting
his or her death before given the opportunity to life."
Jost, supra note 15, at 86.
255. The judge wrote that
Mr. Madyun explained that his refusal to consent to the performance of a Caesarean was based upon his belief that there was no demonstrable danger at that
point to either Mrs. Madyun or the fetus. For example, Mr. Madyun stated that
there were no signs of the onset of sepsis except a slightly elevated temperature. Further it was his belief that there had been insufficient opportunity for
his wife to deliver vaginally. He also expressed his view that the Hospital had
failed to permit Mrs. Madyun to engage in certain potentially natural acts of
assisting delivery, such as standing up or walking around.
Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2239 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For a
discussion of judges' tendency to listen to doctors more than patients in court-ordered
treatment cases, see Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 500-04.
256. As mentioned earlier, legal commentators have noted the effect of time constraints in forced Cesarean cases. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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More importantly, a closer look at each of the representations
Cumming made reveals that, not surprisingly, he was operating on
the medical model of birthing in assessing his patient's condition.
If, instead, one approaches the case from the perspective of critics
of the medical model, the possible weaknesses in Cumming's analysis and the appropriateness of the Madyuns' view of their situation become apparent. 27 Moreover, once the monolithic nature
of the medical model is brought into question, it is no longer
possible to dismiss the couple's objections as bad parenting; instead, we must confront the possibility that their choice constituted
a rejection of the exercise of illegitimate social power against
them.
a. Pathologizingof labor. The physician's medical-model assumptions are revealed most obviously in the extent to which
he presented Madyun's labor pattern as abnormal and highly dangerous. For example, his statements that a "normal" labor lasts ten
to fifteen hours and that delivery more than 24 hours after the
waters break is dangerous stem from the tendency of traditional
medicine to systematize labor, 8 coming up with standardized
charts that represent the average traits of all women and then expecting each individual woman to conform to that norm.259 To
the unaware, however, such statements conceal as much as they
reveal. For example, one study of 1046 births found that the average length of labor (for first-time mothers giving birth at home)
was approximately sixteen hours;2 these data would suggest that
the range of lengths of labor could easily have extended past 24
257. My point in this subsection is not to try to prove that the Madyuns' assessment
of the situation was "right." Rather, it is to suggest that there was more than one
"right" way to view Ms. Madyun's labor. By a "right way," I mean a way that reaches
an acceptable balancing of the concerns that all parents and physicians share in approaching a birth: concerns for the health and well-being of the fetus, the health and
well-being of the mother, and the health and well-being of their family. Different individuals will be more or less risk-averse and will weigh each of these concerns differently,
depending on their individual circumstances.
258. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
259. For a description and critique of this "averaging" of labor stages, see ROTHMAN,
supra note 158, at 259-74. Rothman argues that using the same logic, "we would say that
a woman of six feet one inch was not only unusually tall, but that we should treat her
medically for her 'height condition."' Id. at 260.
260. Lewis E. Mehl, Research on Alternatives in Childbirth: What Can It Tell Us
About Hospital Practice?, in 1 21sT CENTURY OBsmRIcs Now! 171, 186-89 (Lee Stewart & David Stewart eds., 1977).
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hours. Moreover, many midwives are perfectly comfortable allowing women to labor for two or three days, or even more,261 and
the incidence of infections in births assisted by midwives, who do
not follow such standardized models, is less than that in hospital
births.' Perhaps for this reason, some hospitals have now abandoned the "24-hour rule" altogether."6
In addition, as previously mentioned, the United States has a
much higher Cesarean rate than most industrialized countries.
Moreover, the "failure to progress" diagnosis (which seems to be
the one applied in Madyun) is widely thought to be one of the
most overused and challengeable bases for performing the surgery.' Thus, Cumming's characterization of Madyun's labor as
"abnormal" was technically accurate but also highly misleading. It
need not have conveyed the alarming message that it did. To
someone who approaches childbirth as a dangerous process to be
controlled, any deviation from the norm is ominous. To someone
who sees it instead as a usually safe activity that can vary among
individuals, such variation is to be expected.

261. See, e.g., INA M. GASKIN, SPIRITUAL MIDWIFERY 26-27, 222-23 (rev. ed. 1980)
(describing numerous midwife-attended labors that exceeded 24 hours); id. at 349 (stating
that if the membranes are still intact and certain other conditions are met, "the first
stage can stretch over three or four days and still be perfectly normal"); ROTHMAN,
supra note 158, at 262 (quoting a midwife describing having supervised a woman for a
48-hour labor). Thus, it seems to me that even when the membranes have broken, midwives are unlikely to believe that delivery must occur within 24 hours.
262. A leading study found that four times as many hospital babies as home-birth
babies became infected, whereas both perinatal (during birth) and neonatal (after birth)
infant mortality rates for the two groups were essentially the same. Mehl, supra note 260,
at 199. In addition, a study of 722 midwife-assisted births at a long-standing commune in
Tennessee reported the incidence of postpartum infection in the birthing mothers at 3.1%
GASKIN, supra note 261, app. H. The study did not list any data on infection in the
newborns, which could suggest that there probably was little or none.
263. For example, a friend of mine who birthed her child in the same hospital where
I had birthed mine a few years earlier reported to me that when she asked about the
rule, which had been in force during my labor, she was told that it was no longer followed.
264. "Dystocia has been called a 'wastebasket' term. It accounts for 43 percent of all
Cesareans and 30 percent of the increase in Cesarean sections from 1970 to 1978." BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECrIVE, supra note 99, at 386. A study comparing
Cesarean data from Dublin and the United States found that dystocia resulted in C-sections in only 0.7% of Dublin births but in 4.7% of births in this country. During the
period studied, perinatal mortality fell dramatically in Dublin, as it has in this country as
well, indicating that the lower C-section usage did not endanger infants. F. GARY
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILIAMS OBsmTics 442-43 (18th ed. 1989).
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Furthermore, Cumming's testimony ignores the extent to
which the physicians may themselves have contributed to the problems attendant to Madyun's labor and hence makes birthing in
general (and her situation in particular) seem more pathological
and dangerous than it really is. There is no way, of course, to
know with any degree of certainty whether the medical "management" of the labor was counterproductive, but some facts in the
case are suggestive. For example, Mr. Madyun complained that the
reason his wife's labor had not progressed more rapidly was that
the physicians had prevented her from walking around, which they
probably did to allow the use of a fetal monitor. As I have said,
movement is widely thought by alternative birthing practitioners to
speed the progress of labor, and monitors are acknowledged, by
traditional as well as alternative health professionals, to be highly
unreliable.
Thus, the use of the monitor might have caused
more problems than it solved.
Similarly, Madyun had undergone ten vaginal exams during
the course of her 23-hour stay in the hospital; as the court itself
noted, such exams themselves increase the risk of infection. Finally, alternative birth professionals also maintain that a relaxed atmosphere is essential to the progress of a woman's labor.
Thus, the atmosphere of conflict over the duration of Madyun's
labor could itself have contributed to her "failure to progress." In
several ways, then, the physicians treating Madyun may have
themselves created the situation that caused them to call for the
Cesarean. Had they allowed their patient to labor without physical
or emotional constraint and refrained from conducting so many
exams, the labor may have been quicker and the risk of infection
less.
b. Risk averseness. Dr. Cumming followed the medical
model not only in his assumption that labors that do not follow
narrow standardized patterns are dangerous but also in the cautious (and selective) assessments revealed in his testimony about
the risks presented. From his testimony, it appeared clear that

265. The false positive rate of fetal monitors (the percentage of inaccurate readings of
fetal distress) may be as high as 80%. Daniels, supra note 15, at 1070.
266. See, e.g., BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 99, at
361-65 (criticizing "climate of doubt" that physicians and hospitals create and noting the
value of a "climate of confidence").
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Madyun's situation posed an unacceptable danger to her fetus and
little danger to her. Yet this conclusion is possible only if one
emphasizes the risks to the fetus and deemphasizes the risks to the
mother.
It is unclear from the case exactly what the doctor was referring to when he listed the risk to the mother of having a C-section
as 0.25%. One study found that the risk of maternal death during
birth from Cesareans was 22 per 100,000 or 0.022%.267 In contrast, the risk of death during a vaginal delivery is one in 10,000
or 0.01%, making maternal death twice as likely in a C-section
delivery.26 The risk of serious complications due to Cesareans,
however, is certainly much higher, and complications are both
more likely and more severe following a Cesarean than a vaginal
birth.269 Similarly, although Dr. Cumming stated that the risk to
the fetus of infection increased, in his opinion, with each passing
hour, he did not specifically state (at least as far as is revealed in
the court opinion) whether the risk of fetal fatality due to infection similarly increased with time. Furthermore, he apparently did
not discount the risk that vaginal birth posed to the fetus by the
zT0
risk that a Cesarean posed to it.

267. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 175, at 593. It is worth noting, moreover, that
studies available at the time of the judge's decision in Madyun contained this higher
figure. See Leary, supra note 195, at B16.
268. Leary, supra note 195, at B16; accord, NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, supra note
175, at 16. Other studies have found C-sections to be four times more likely to be fatal.
See supra note 267.
269. "[Mjaternal morbidity rates are generally 5 to 10 times higher following Cesarean
birth" than following vaginal birth. NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 175, at 260.
Postoperative infections occur in 33% of women who undergo Cesareans. BOSTON
WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 99, at 385. Moreover, rates of postpartum infection following Cesarean delivery are much higher for low-income women
than for other women. NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 175, at 262.
270. As one commentator has noted,
The infant ... faces greater risks from Cesarean delivery, including higher
rates of medically induced prematurity and respiratory distress. This risk appears
to be even higher for low-income and minority women's children, who are more
likely to be born prematurely and/or with low birth weight. Data from New
York City, for instance, show that, for infants weighing less than 2,501 grams,
Cesarean delivery presents a consistent neonatal mortality disadvantage as compared with vaginal births.
Daniels, supra note 15, at 1069 (footnotes omitted). One study found that infant mortality
decreased when the C-section rate decreased. See Luis Sanchez-Ramos et al., Reducing
Caesarean Sections at a Teaching Hospital, 163 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1081,
1082-84 (1990).
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Thus, the risk data the physician presented were incomplete, if
not misleading. They seem to indicate that the comparative risks
of death to fetus and mother were at least 200 to 1, but the reality of the situation might have been quite different. For example, if
the 50-75% risk level had to do just with the possibility of the
infant contracting an infection (as opposed to dying), then it certainly does not seem "ridiculous" for someone to decide to face
that risk rather than undergo a Cesarean, which itself can cause
harm to the fetus in addition to the mother. In fact, the calculus
of risks required in such a situation is so complicated-on the one
hand, a Cesarean presents an indeterminate risk of harm (perhaps
severe) to the fetus and of death (two times greater than with
vaginal birth), serious complications, or severe discomfort to the
mother; on the other hand, vaginal birth presents an apparently
indeterminateP' risk (mild, serious, or deadly) of infection to the
fetus and a lower risk to the mother-that what seems ridiculous
is to suggest that there could be a single right answer at all. From
the perspective of critics of the medical model, who emphasize
that individuals must make their own risk assessments and that
some degree of risk is an acceptable (indeed inevitable) part of
birthing, Ms. Madyun's willingness to continue laboring is one
among many acceptable ways to strike the balance of risks.
The physician's conclusory decision that the indeterminate risk
of infection in the newborn outweighs the doubling in the risk of
death to the mother (as well as the additional risk of complications to both) reveals an underlying assumption (perhaps unconscious) that women both are and should be self-sacrificing. The
hortatory aspect of this assumption (women should be self-sacrificing) is most obvious: in dismissing the risks to the mother, the
doctor treats her needs as less important than those of her child.
She is supposed to be willing to sacrifice her well-being-even to
risk death-for the health of her fetus. The factual assumption
behind this weighing of the risks (women are self-sacrificing) be-

271. That the risks to fetuses are often fairly indeterminate is borne out by the fact
that many of the fetuses thought to have been at risk have turned out to have no serious problems when born after a court-ordered Cesarean. Kolder et al., supra note 14, at
1192. In fact, there have been at least five cases of healthy vaginal delivery after unsuccessful hospital attempts to perform court-ordered C-sections. Jost, supra note 15, at 86.
(I should note that by "unsuccessful" I do not necessarily mean "rejected by the court,"
because in some of these cases the woman evaded the court orders in order to deliver
vaginally. Id.)
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comes evident in light of physicians' tendency to believe that as
long as the fetus is born without injury, women will not sue even
if they themselves suffer discomfort or harm.' Thus, physicians
tend to assume that their patients will usually conform to gender
role expectations, putting their offspring's interests ahead of their
own. When faced with a patient who does not (in the physician's
eyes) conform to such expectations, especially one whose identifying characteristics already mark her as a bad mother, some doctors
easily move to the assumption that her behavior justifies coercion. 273
In short, the Madyun case confirms the possibility that when
physicians order Cesarean sections, they are actually imposing a
particular, contingent view of the birthing process, and of women,
on their patients. Viewing the process as pathological, seeking to
minimize risks to the fetus at all costs, and assuming that mothers
are, and should be, self-sacrificing, they base their "scientific"
judgments on contested factual assumptions and value choices. 4

272. See infra note 273.
273. I am assuming in this discussion that the physicians were actually doing what
they thought was best for the two patients they saw themselves as treating, mother and
fetus. There is actually a fair amount of evidence, however, to suggest that the reasons
physicians take the approach they do might have to do with factors other than their
medical judgments about how best to "manage" this particular labor. Studies show that
the single greatest reason for the dramatic increase in Cesarean section rates over the
last twenty years is fear of malpractice suits. See O'Reilly et al., supra note 207, at 199.
According to one study, "Physicians said that a Cesarean is 'defensive medicine' and that
even if the baby was 'less than perfect,' if a Cesarean had been done they were covered." Id. Mistakenly believing that they were less at risk for malpractice liability if they
performed the surgery, id. at 199-200, physicians did so explicitly to protect themselves.
Similarly, fetal monitors are often used defensively because physicians believe
(rightly, perhaps) that failure to put one in place leaves them open to a malpractice suit
should the delivery not go well. See id. at 201-02 (noting that the standard of care used
in medical malpractice cases subjects physicians who do not employ commonly used procedures to liability, even if those procedures are not reliable). Thus, in requiring Ms.
Madyun to use a fetal monitor (which in turn prevented movement) and ultimately ordering a Cesarean, Dr. Cumming and his colleagues may have been as concerned with
protecting themselves as with protecting their patient's fetus.
It may be worth mentioning that in explaining the defensive medicine pressures
that may lead a doctor to "order" a Cesarean section, I do not mean to suggest that the
race and class assumptions discussed above do not account for court-ordered C-sections.
Rather, it is these defensive pressures, combined with the race and class assumptions discussed above, that determine which situations seem risky to physicians and which of the
risky situations justify seeking a court order.
274. The external influences on physicians' diagnoses in the birthing context, see supra
note 273, suggest that, in enforcing doctors' orders in such cases, courts may be encouraging conduct that protects the health of neither women nor their fetuses. The behaviors

19931

COLONIZATION OF THE WOMB

565

Yet despite the uncertain grounds for medical conclusions,
judges continue to grant requests for court orders in such situations. Unquestioningly accepting the medical model of reproduction as "truth" and rejecting alternative approaches as ridiculous,
the courts draw the inevitable conclusion that women who resist
doctors' orders are irresponsible, hysterical, and/or dangerous.
Moreover, to the extent that judges entertain any of the prevailing
stereotypes of outsider women, their attitudes make it that much
easier for them to minimize the health and autonomy interests of
the women, while accepting the doctors' assessments as accurate.
By deferring to the doctor in these cases, the courts effectively
delegate to physicians the power to decide which birthing decisions
are acceptable and which are not. This delegation is the final
critical step in a process that, through medical and legal discourse,
defines mothers as "good" or "bad" depending on whether or not
they accept "medically necessary" procedures. 75 Thus, these decisions not only stem from but also confirm pejorative stereotypes of
outsider women. Simultaneously, they both rely upon and validate
traditional medical authority. In the next Part, I suggest that judicial investment in the medical model is attributable not simply to
the fact that people generally do not see medicine as socially constructed but also to law's investment in dualistic thinking, thinking
which is challenged by the notion of alternative health care.

in which physicians may engage, such as the use of a fetal monitor, frequent vaginal exams, and the concern about sticking to schedules, may be motivated as much by a desire
to protect themselves from liability as by a belief that these behaviors are medically required. Enforcing doctors' orders in such cases is problematic not only because of the
time constraints that are necessarily a part of such situations and the value choices inherent in medical decisions, but also because such enforcement allows physicians to place
their own financial interests ahead of the health interests of their patients.
275. Interestingly, this is not the first time that physicians have been involved in labelling women as good or bad in the context of state-imposed coercion. See EHRENREICH
& ENGLISH, supra note 187, at 19 (describing physicians' role in identifying "witches"
during European witch-trials).
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LAW AND MEDICINE AS MUTUALLY LEGITIMATING
DIscouRsEs AND PRACTICES

If the refusal of a [cesarean] section can be interpreted as resistance to the dominant ideology, a court-ordered cesarean section
is an overt repression of alternative actions and alternative ways
of knowing. A court-ordered cesarean section not only determines the authority of a particular doctor over a particular woman, it confirms medical authority in birthing' 6

At least in legal literature, little attention has been paid to
how the dualisms described in Part I serve to legitimate not only
legal rhetoric and decisions but also the discourses of other dominant institutions in society, such as medicine. Although legal scholars have begun to dissect the complex web of interrelationships
between patriarchy, capitalism, and white supremacy,2' they have
not yet focused much on the ways in which particular societal
institutions interact with each other and interface with the dualisms
that they help to construct and are constructed by. In this Part, I
address the ways in which various sets of dualisms serve to legitimate both the medical model of reproduction and the legal system
that enforces it. An understanding of the legitimating function of
those dualisms, I suggest, helps to explain the extraordinary reliance that judges place on medical decisionmakers in this context.
Legal authorities in general pay great deference to medical
expertise. The most obvious example of this deference, of course,
is the retention of a custom standard to define medical malpracticeY8 Whereas negligent behavior in the vast majority of activities is judged by a reasonable person standard, medicine (along
with other professions) is allowed to be its own judge, with the
standard of care for malpractice suits defined as what a reasonably
prudent physician (not layperson) would do. Although the courts
rejected more than sixty years ago the notion that ship captains or
masons or police officers should be allowed to set their own standards,2 9 physicians are still thought appropriately to do so.'

276. Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 331.
277. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 1; Roberts, supra note 20;
278. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON

THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 32, at 189 (5th ed. 1984); see also O'Reilly et al., supra note 207, at 200-02.
279. See, e.g., The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 287 U.S. 662

(1932).
280. KEETON ET AL., supra note 278, § 32, at 189. But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d
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While judges apparently feel perfectly comfortable deciding (or

asking a jury to decide) what constitutes reasonable care for other
holders of technical knowledge (based, of course, on expert testi-

mony), they are apparently very uneasy doing what seems to be
the second-guessing of doctors.
In the area of reproduction, this judicial deference to medical
authority is particularly marked. The grandfather" opinion establishing physicians as the gatekeepers of women's reproductive
rights is, of course, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v.
Wade.' Despite his obvious concern for women required to undergo forced childbirth,' Justice Blackmun nevertheless "subsumed the woman's right to privacy within the ambit of the doctor-patient relationship, and ultimately subordinated her interest to
Characterizing the abortion decision as prithe physician's."'
marily a medical, rather than a moral, one,' Justice Blackmun
articulated the Roe right as the right of "the attending physician,
in consultation with his patient ...

to determine ...

that, in his

medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."'

Thus, even the foundational reproductive rights case

981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the fact that an opthamologist followed custom was not
sufficient to insulate him from liability for his failure to test a patient for glaucoma).
Of course, this treatment of medicine is not unique. Lawyers and other professions
also get to set their own standards. In fact, the parallels between prevailing images of,
and judicial attitudes toward, law and medicine, see infra text accompanying notes 293-96,
may account, in part, for their similar treatment. A general discussion of professional
standards of care, however, is beyond the scope of my concern here.
281. Yes, the gendering here is intentional.
282. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
283. Justice Blackmun noted early in his opinion the dramatic impact that the continuation of a pregnancy can have on a woman.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying [the abortion] choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved.
Id at 153.
284. Asaro, supra note 75, at 53 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
285. Id. at 54 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
286. 410 U.S. at 163. For additional examples of judicial deference to physicians in
abortion and sterilization cases, see Asaro, supra note 75, at 55-59, 95-98.
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really only gives the woman the right to have a doctor decide for
her.
This judicial tendency to subsume women's interest in controlling their reproductive capacities within physicians' right to practice
medicine reflects a similar attitude in the society at large. That
attitude is strikingly apparent in reactions to the recent "gag rule"
case, Rust v. Sullivan, in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
regulations that prohibited doctors in federally funded clinics from
discussing abortion with their patients. Much of the media coverage and publicly expressed criticism of that case focused on its
unfairness to doctors, emphasizing that the case would make it
difficult for them to practice their profession and might open them
up to malpractice liability.' Even when women's interests were
specifically addressed, as often as not it was the need for access to
freely given medical advice, not the right to control one's own
reproductive capacity, that was highlighted. 9
Deference can be particularly extreme in the Cesarean section
context. Susan Irwin and Brigitte Jordan, in their study of nine
forced C-section cases, report that judges are much more likely to
listen to medical testimony, which tends to be stated in numbers,
than to the testimony of the woman herself, which tends to be
stated in experiential terms.2" More importantly, judges in the
cases those authors reviewed overvalued both medical opinion and
machine data, causing Irwin and Jordan to note that "if produced
by the medical staff any number, reasonable or not, had legitimacy. '291 In contrast, the more "contextualized" knowledge conveyed by laboring women, such as conclusions based on accounts
of their previous labors, was "easily dismissed as personal, subjective, idiosyncratic ... in a word, unscientific." 292 Moreover, any
one medical opinion was treated as authoritative, with no attempts
made to obtain conflicting opinion from, for example, physicians

287. Ill S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
288. See, e.g., Spencer Rich, Administration Partly Lifts Ban on Abortion Advice; Regulations Allow Exception for Doctors, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1992, at Al (noting that
new regulations allowing doctors to provide abortion counselling were adopted in response to public perception that government was interfering with the doctor-patient relationship).
289. See, e.g., Mimi Hall, Abortion Doctors Fear 'Greater Stress' for Patients, USA
TODAY, June 30, 1992, at 5A.
290. Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 329.
291. Id.

292. Id.
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outside the hospital involved,2 93 and with no concern expressed

that testimony elicited from only one or two doctors might prove
unreliable.
When considered in light of the sets of associations previously
described, law's great deference to medicine is perhaps not surprising. As I mentioned earlier, law is associated with many of the
same traits as medicine. Both are thought to be neutral and objective pursuits, devoid of personal bias or subjective self-interest.
Both are seen as coldly rational-as based on facts and rules,
rather than opinions and values. Moreover, both are seen as controlling people: whereas medicine controls their physical bodies,
law controls the body politic, providing a peaceful means for resolving disputes that otherwise might dissolve into warfare. Put
another way, medicine controls physical nature, whereas law avoids
a social "state of nature." Finally, both fields are populated by
elite white men who enjoy very comfortable incomes and high
status. Given these affinities, judicial trust in the medical profession to make dispassionate and value-free decisions in individual
cases is not surprising.
Because law and medicine are thought to share these valued
traits, judicial deference to medicine does not undermine the legitimacy of law but rather reinforces it. If we accept that the types of
situations addressed in this Article pose justiciable issues-that is,
if we accept that judges have any business deciding whether a
woman can be forced to undergo Cesarean surgery in any particular instance (itself a debatable point 294)-then the stricture that
such decisions be reached neutrally, objectively, and dispassionately
comes into play. Presumably believing themselves to be operating
under such a stricture, judges are probably loathe to base their
decisions on criteria that seem subjective, interested, or emotional.
A particular party's own assessment of the situation is always
suspect in law; in the birthing context, the female patient's views
are paradigmatically subjective, with all the negative connotations. 295 In contrast, by deferring to the medical professionals
293. Id. at 330-31. Although time constraints undoubtedly account for at least part of
this failure to seek alternative medical opinions, some of the cases Irwin and Jordan
describe extended over days or even weeks, id. at 322-23 (describing cases involving

placenta previa, known well in advance of the labor), which suggests that time shortage
was not the only reason for the failure.
294. See Johnsen, supra note 82; McNulty, supra note 82; Rhoden, supra note 14.
295. See also supra subsection I(D)(1) (discussing how femaleness and unscientific
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who 9 6testify in such a case, the court preserves its neutral im2
age.
Deferring to medical opinion thus legitimates judicial power.
Were a court to acknowledge that there is more than one effective
way to give birth, it would have to acknowledge as well that
birthing is a contested terrain, in which battles over social power
are waged. In contrast, by perceiving and presenting its decision as
based on rational medical assessment, the court obscures the possibility that the decision is instead the product of some combination
of race, class, and gender assumptions or of the court's own vision
of the good life. Constructing the choice as between superstition
and self-interest, on the one hand, and science and disinterest, on
the other, judicial deference precludes the possibility that the
court's decision effectuates instead a choice between male and
female control of reproduction.
Court-ordered C-sections not only legitimate the judicial system but also reinforce the cultural authority of the medical profession. By treating the physician as the only legitimate source of
information about the woman's body and the birthing process,
judicial decisions ordering such surgeries both rely upon and express the assumption that medical knowledge is monolithic.2" By
devaluing other types of knowledge-whether the individual
woman's or the alternative birth movement's-and by placing the
power of the state behind the physician's decision, "court-ordered
cesarean sections maintain medical authority by contributing to the
'
reproduction of relations in which physicians control birthing."298
Judicial deference to medical opinion in such cases also confirms
the objectivity and neutrality of medical judgments, and thereby
obscures the operation of social power in those judgments. Since
courts are thought to base their decisions in such cases on facts,
not values, their reliance on medical testimony gives credence to

superstitions are associated with one another).
296. I believe a complicated legitimation process is at work here. That is, judges' acceptance of the notion that medical experts know more about women's bodies than women themselves do contributes to their unwillingness to listen to the patient in the first
place. The notion that physicians know more also serves as an after-the-fact legitimation
of results that are produced by other factors, such as race, class, and gender bias or
blindness.
297. "Legal complicity in the construction of monolithic medical authority is evident in
the lack of credibility given-to women in these cases." Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at
330.
298. Id. at 331.
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medicine's self-presentation. Indeed, the lack of attention given to
the views of the women patients themselves contrasts with that
given the physicians, creating the distinct impression that courts
are discerning in the types of evidence they will accept and thereby redounding to the benefit of the doctors (as well as the judges). Thus, just as medicine's image as objective science provides
the basis on which legal choices about who controls reproduction
can be presented as distanced and objective dispute resolution, so
law's image as rational and unbiased provides the basis on which
medical decisions about who controls reproduction can be presented as the product of neutral scientific judgment.
In summary, court-ordered Cesarean sections can be seen, not
as deserved control of dangerous women, but rather as coercive
responses to acts of resistance by outsider women who seek to
prevent the control of their reproductive activities by privileged
men. The relationship between the medical and legal professions,
however, prevents the recognition of this aspect of such interactions. By mutually reinforcing each other's objectivity and neutrality, medicine and law obscure the social power that they together exert.
III.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 29

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power
in negative terms: it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it
"abstracts," it "masks," it "conceals." In fact, power produces; it
produces reality ....

The individual and the knowledge that

may be gained of him belong to this production."
A. Hegemony and Ideology
The differences between the experiences and treatment of
outsider women and privileged women in the reproductive arena
suggest that social power may be exerted over them, and affect
them, in fundamentally different ways. Thus, as I have intimated,
one might say that the power exercised over privileged women
299. For the analysis presented in this Part, I draw heavily on the work of Michel
Foucault. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 182; ALAN SHERIDAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT:
THE WILL TO TRUTH (1980).

300. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 194
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
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through medical and legal discourses has been hegemonic in nature-effectuated through such women's habitual acquiescence in
medical control-whereas that exercised over outsider women has
been ideological-achieved through open coercion that is justified
by an explicit ideology of domination."' Privileged women seem
to be subjugated by their desire to be good mothers, outsider
women by their definition as bad mothers (and therefore as needing and deserving of control). This hypothesis further suggests that
high-income white women are less likely to be aware of their
subjugated status than low-income white women and women of
color because hegemonic power is subtle and indirect, whereas
ideological power is obvious since it is implemented through direct
force. Indeed, much of the material that I have presented here is
consistent with such a description, at least if that description is
comparatively phrased. That is, outsider women are probably
openly coerced more often than privileged women; privileged
women are probably controlled by force of habit more often than
outsider women.3"
Thus, for example, anthropologist Rayna Rapp reports that
low-income African-American women faced with the question of

301. I rely here on theorists who, following the work of Antonio Gramsci, have argued that power has two components or is exercised and maintained in two ways:
through ideology and through hegemony. See, e.g., JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN COMAROFF,
OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION 19-27 (1991). As used by such writers, ideology

means the expressed belief system of a society or group. (The United States, for example, is an individualistic society in which the stated ideology is that people achieve status,
rather than having it ascribed to them-that individual merit, effort, and ability are what
produce one's position in the world.) Ideology is the visible face of power, id. at 24, and
it is enforced through visible, legitimate (that is, it is seen as legitimate) coercion.
Hegemony, in contrast, is the invisible face of power. Id. It is the "taken for granted" in a worldview, the aspects of the dominant group's belief system that are so subtle
that they are not seen as beliefs at all but rather just as the "way things are." Id. at 23.
It controls people by affecting what they see as sensible, reasonable, or believable, as
well as what they can even conceive of, what they can imagine. See Stuart Hall, The
Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 35, 44 (Lawrence Grossberg & Cary Nelson eds., 1988). Unlike

ideology, hegemony is therefore not usually experienced as power at all. Instead, it is
experienced as fact, truth, or nature. Through hegemony, the control of the dominant
group in a society is "effected not so much by sanctions and coercion as by the consent
and passive compliance of subordinate classes." JAMES C. ScoTrr, WEAPONS OF THE
WEAK 316 (1985). Hegemonic power is exerted not through force but through the force
of habit. See COMAROFF & COMAROFF, supra, at 22-23.

302. I should emphasize, however, that the suggestions that I am making are tentative
and provisional. There simply is not enough information about different groups of
women's attitudes to draw definitive conclusions.
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whether to use amniocentesis are less likely to accept medical
discourse about the procedure, or to see science as a means to
make life better, than are high-income white women. 3 Similarly,
in a study of women's attitudes towards birthing, Emily Martin
concludes that middle-class women adopt the medical profession's
preoccupation with controlling the birth experience, whereas working-class women tend to be less concerned about losing control (by
loudly screaming, for example). Martin suggests that such loss of
control by working-class women may actually, in fact, be a form of
resistance-against either the hospital personnel or the women's
health movement itself (with its middle-class emphasis on control
of labor (through breathing, for example)). 3 4 These studies seem
to suggest that outsider women are less likely to accept medical
representations of the reproductive process at face value.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the possibility that
power operates hegemonically upon outsider women as well (although not in exactly the same way).' For example, it has been
pointed out that African-American women sometimes accept the
devaluing imagery applied to them by the dominant culture, resulting in a form of "internalized oppression. ''3°6 Thus, while many
privileged women accept the good girl image associated with their
group and then struggle to live up to it, many outsider women
accept the bad girl image associated with their group and then
struggle to escape it.3" As Patricia Hill Collins has noted, "unlike white women who 'face the pitfall of being seduced into joining the oppressor under the pretense of sharing power,'

women are offered no such

possibility. ''31

. .

. Black

Instead, she says, they

303. Rapp, supra note 53, at 31-32.
304. See Emily Martin, The Ideology of Reproduction: The Reproduction of Ideology,
in UNCERTAIN TERMS, supra note 13 at 300, 308-10.
305. It might be worth acknowledging that power of course also operates in openly
coercive ways against privileged women at times, such as, for example, in rape. Even in
the reproductive realm, brutally direct physical violence is sometimes directed at highincome white women. See, e.g., COREA, supra note 118, at 311-12 (recounting the genital
mutilation of a middle-class woman without her consent). Even then, my suspicion is that
usually the woman is first conceptualized as a "fallen" woman-a bad girl-before she is
so treated. In that respect, even rape victims are denigrated as "others" before (or as)
their attacks are perpetrated or legitimated. In short, it may be metaphysically impossible
in this society for a woman identified as "good" to be openly coerced.
306. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 20, at 83.
307. Even when power operates hegemonically, it does not operate on EuropeanAmerican women and women of color in exactly the same way.
308. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 83 (quoting LORDE, supra note 2, at 117-18 (1984)).
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sometimes internalize denigrated images of themselves or try to
separate themselves from black culture and assimilate into the
white world.3" Thus, power sometimes operates hegemonically
upon outsider women, as well as upon privileged women.
Although little data are available about whether power operates hegemonically on outsider women in the medical-reproductive
arena in particular, it seems likely that they, like affluent white
women, at times uncritically accept the image of medicine as objective science. Some data are suggestive of this point. Martin
reports that whereas middle-class women want their birthing experiences to be "aesthetically beautiful," working-class women just
want to eliminate the pain.31 Similarly, Margaret Nelson finds
that whereas middle-class women want "active, involved births free
of medical interventions, 311 working-class women want "more
passive birth experiences with more medical intervention"3"' as
well as "instructional," rather than "cooperative," relationships
with their physicians. 313 Both the preoccupation of working-class
women with eliminating pain and their willingness to leave more
control in the hands of physicians suggest that these women may
themselves operate under an ilusion-about both the expertise of
medicine and the need to control its exercise. That is, these women might somewhat naively assume that it is possible to eliminate
the pain of birthing without producing other problems (additional
pain through C-sections, emotionally painful disrespectful treatment
and loss of autonomy, and the like), and they might be overly
optimistic about the benefits that they will derive from ceding
control to their physicians. In short, they might mistakenly believe
that one can avail oneself of the technical expertise of doctors
without exposing oneself to the social power such doctors wield
through medicine.314
309. Id. at 83-84.
310. Martin, supra note 304, at 308-09.
311.

Margaret K. Nelson, Birth and Social Class, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH,

supra note 207, at 143.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 157. Martin's data suggest that John Robertson's emphasis on the aesthetic
preferences of mothers stems from an upper- or middle-class perspective that excludes
the concerns of low-income women. I suspect, however, that the privileged women who
actively resist the medical model out of a conviction that birth is not pathological are
less concerned with aesthetics than the more numerous women who favor "natural" birth
in the same way that they favor "natural" ice cream. I also suspect that the latter usually do not resist doctors' orders.
314. Another study of how women relate to health care professionals also suggests
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There is another reason, however, why the thesis that privileged women are subordinated through the force of habit and
outsider women are subordinated through a habit of force is inadequate to fully describe the operation of power in the reproductive
realm. That reason has to do with how power is conceptualized.
As the rest of this Part attempts to demonstrate, if we conceptualize power as not merely the assertion of control over one group
by another group but rather as the constituting of an entire social
reality by certain institutional structures and discursive practices,
then the dichotomy between hegemony and ideology seems less
useful as a descriptive tool.
B. Power and Knowledge
From the discussion thus far, it should be apparent that when
I say that court-ordered Cesarean sections constitute an exercise of
coercive power against the women subjected to them, I am not
focusing merely on the court orders themselves. Rather, the power
that is exercised in these settings is exerted by physicians as well
as judges, and by the medical and legal professions as a whole as
well as by the particular practitioners involved.
In short, I am operating with a conception of power that is
substantially broader than "power over." Power as it operates in
the reproductive arena is not negative, but rather positive315 or
constitutive. It resides in medical diagnoses, treatment recommendations, and "expert" predictions, not just in the court order or
even in the doctor's decision to seek such an order. Power is
found in the assumption that there is such a thing as "normal"
labor, and in the attendant role of physicians to define what such
"normal" labor is and to identify when (and in whom) it exists.
The fundamental power being exercised in these situations is
the power to construct reality, to say what is happening. Once that
power is ceded to physicians, the results in the cases are foregone

that some outsider women unquestioningly accept the physician's role as "impartial expert." See Gertrude Fraser, Modem Minds, Modem Bodies: Reproductive Change in an
African-American Community, in CONCEIVING THE NEw WORLD ORDER: THE POLITICS
OF REPRODUCTION (Rayna Rapp & Faye Ginsburg eds., forthcoming 1994) (describing
how some African-American patients of midwives have attitudes consonant with the medicolegal model of reproduction).
315. These are Alan Sheridan's terms. See SHERIDAN, supra note 299, at 165 (discussing FOUCAULT, supra note 300, at 194).
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conclusions. Because of the positivist and dualist mindset of most
judges, who still view their role as deciding the "facts" and then
applying the law to them, one description of reality precludes
another. If the facts as given by the physician are correct, then
those presented by the patient cannot also be correct. In the
search for a unitary vision of the event, the expert's image will
necessarily win out.
In other words, when power is exerted over women in their
reproductive lives, it is exerted not only on their bodies 16 but
through them as well. In fact, it is scientific discourse, and its
transformation of women into the objects of knowledge, that make
possible their subjugation through violence. Medicine controls
women by creating them; it inscribes its bureaucratic, mechanized,
and patriarchal images of reality onto their very bodies."' In this
sense, even outsider women subjected to court-ordered Cesareans
are, in an ultimate sense, controlled by indirect rather than direct
force, for it is the credibility of medicine's statements about the
"reality" of their labors that both generates and legitimates the
court orders through which the actual, physical violence is enacted.
It is the physician's power to describe the woman physically-to
say what her body is like and what is happening to it, to create a
governing perception of it-that in turn produces his power to
define what the woman is socially-to label her as irresponsible or
irrational and to make the moral judgment that she not only requires but deserves control. It is through the medical profession's
monopoly over the production of what gets recognized as knowl-

316. I do mean literally on their bodies. In one court-ordered Cesarean case, for
example, a woman was tied down to the bed after her husband, who also objected to
the surgery, was forcibly removed from the hospital by seven security officers. Janet
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 9, 9-10 (1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Cesarean surgery
itself is enacted on women's bodies, forever scarring them.
317. See, eg., BUTLER, supra note 13, at 106-11 (addressing the failure of mainstream
molecular cell biology to recognize DNA configurations which challenge the division of
human beings into two sexes); MARTIN, supra note 163, at 63 (describing how birthing is
conceptualized as a form of industrial labor, with the physician as the foreman); Martin,
supra note 171, at 492, 497 (describing how medical texts describe sperm as "burrowing"
into eggs, when in fact what actually transpires could just as easily be described as eggs
"enveloping" sperm); cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 300, at 24-28 (describing criminal punishment as not merely "negative" mechanisms that repress or prevent criminality but also
as positive exercises of power that subjugate individuals "by turning them into objects of
knowledge").
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edge about women's bodies that women, through the complicity of
law, are coerced.
C. The Problem of Resistance
Of course, one of the implications of saying that power resides in "scientific" discourse and medical "expertise" is that it
cannot necessarily be perceived as such. When doctors say that
fetuses are at risk, or even that women's objections to Cesarean
sections are "ridiculous," such statements are seen as asserting
truth, not power. To the extent that women themselves accept
such statements as "truths," they are disabled from resisting medical power through refusing Cesarean surgery or other interventions. Moreover, even when resistance does occur, the women who
refuse to follow doctors' orders tend to be perceived as irresponsible or ignorant, so that the challenge their refusals pose is immediately reduced to either deviance or self-indulgence. This
pathologization of their behavior in turn prevents the behavior's
quality of resistance from being recognized, thereby reinforcing the
conclusion that the court orders that follow are justified. Within
this ideological universe, the notion that birthing is an arena of
conflict, in which women are struggling against a classist, racist,
and patriarchal method of reproduction, is simply beyond the pale.
To the extent that outsider women themselves accept this understanding of medicine, they will ignore their own sense of the situation and do what the doctor orders.
The question thus becomes how one can ever hope to conquer hegemonic power. Since such power masquerades as "just the
way things are," how does it ever come to be seen as
challengeable? If privileged and outsider women often accept
medicine's self-presentation as objective and neutral, how do they
also resist medical power by refusing Cesarean sections? If the
resistance that does occur is reduced to individual deviance, how
can it be effective?
This Section will attempt to answer these questions by suggesting two mechanisms by which resistance is made possible. First,
I will argue that we can account for resistance by conceptualizing
it as emanating, in an extremely subtle way, from alternative-not
necessarily conscious-worldviews that exist, and have existed, in
conflict with currently dominant ways of thinking. Second, I will
argue that resistance will remain interstitial and relatively inconse-
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quential unless and until the various subordinated groups in society become aware of the mutually reinforcing nature of their individual oppressions. That is, only by recognizing the interconnections between their situations will both outsider and privileged
women be able to overcome them.
1. History and Subjugated Knowledges. In order to appreciate the existence of alternative world views from which resistance
can emanate, it is necessary to look briefly at history. As previously mentioned,318 the emerging medical profession wrested control
of birthing from female midwives during the nineteenth century.
Moreover, the pathologizing of labor and birth were a primary
means by which physicians convinced consumers that medical
control of reproduction was necessary. 319 However, long after
privileged women had turned to the medical profession for assistance in birthing, many low-income white women and women of
color continued to rely upon midwives for their reproductive
needs.320 Similarly, among outsider populations, folk remedies,
long stigmatized as "old wives' tales" among the middle classes,
seem to have continued in use to this day.32'
Of course, few contemporary citizens would ascribe the rise of
medicine as a profession to, physicians' ability to steal customers
from midwives. The hegemony of medicine (and science generally)
is so great that most people are simply unaware of the historical
conflicts that produced the existing structure of the health care
system. Thus, rather than seeing midwifery as a competing, alternative approach to the medical model of reproduction, contemporary citizens tend to equate it with quackery and superstition.
For the same reasons, rather than seeing the ascendance of medical birthing as the outcome of a power struggle between doctors
and midwives, they see it instead as reflecting the inevitable, teleological progress of science.
I would like to suggest, however-and it is only a suggestion,
for more information is needed to confirm it-that the awareness
of that struggle has not entirely disappeared. Rather, those
318. See supra note 186.
319. See EHRENREICH, supra note 152, at 112.
320.

THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 99, at 337.

321. To give just an anecdotal example, after I suffered a miscarriage, a low-income
Latina friend of mine offered to give me a home remedy to prevent reoccurrence of the
problem.
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marginalized groups of people who continued to use midwives well
into this century and who retained some knowledge of herbal healing techniques have, even today, conceptualizations of the body
and notions of healing that stand in opposition to contemporary
medical understandings. This alternative body of knowledge is not
necessarily conscious-I do not conceive of it as an articulated
rejection of.medical control (although some people may voice that
understanding as well)-but rather is imbedded in the minute
building blocks of imagery with which people construct their visions of the world. Listen, for example, to the way that a Puerto
Rican garment worker, who is a Charismatic Catholic, rejected the
opportunity to undergo amniocentesis: "No, I take this baby as
God's love, just the way it is, Hallelujah." 3' Or to the way that
a pregnant African-American woman described her recurrent
dreams in which her child turned out to be disabled in some horrible way.
Once or twice, they give him to my husband and say, "look at
your son, take him the way he is." As if the way he is isn't all
right. I tried to get [amniocentesis] to make peace with that
dream (Q: would you have had an abortion if you'd had the
test?) Oh, no. The whole thing was going back to the
dreams ... just so's I could say, "this baby is the baby in the
dreams" and come to peace with it.3
Or to another black woman, faced with an unexpected pregnancy
at age 42:
I thought about abortion ....But in my neighborhood a lot of
Caribbean women have.., late babies. So I got used to it. But
the clinic doctor was freaked out. He sent me for genetic counseling. Counseling? I thought counseling meant giving reassurance, helping someone accept and find their way. Wisdom, help,
guidance, you know what I mean. This lady... started pullin'
out pictures of mongoloids. So I got huffy ....So we got more
and more huffy between us, and finally, I left .... By the time
I got myself to the appointment (for the test) I'd been to see my
healing woman, a healer, who calmed me down ....Oh, I
wouldn't have had an abortion that late in the game. I just got

322. Rapp, supra note 53, at 33.
323. Id. at 32.
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helped out by the healer woman, so I could wait out the results
of that test without too much fussin'.3
None of these women expects to be able to control every aspect
of her pregnancy or to be unable or unwilling to love a child who
is not "perfect." Certainly the third woman, and perhaps all of
them, sees health care as more than the mere provision of factual
information about physiological conditions. Although these women
do not explicitly articulate a detailed rejection of medical science
or a defense of midwifery, residing within each one's assumptions
about femaleness, reproduction, and life is the outline of an alternative method of birthing.
It seems possible, therefore, that at least some outsider women are subjected to more coercive Cesareans not only because as a
group they are labeled bad mothers, but also because as individuals they have an alternative way of thinking about their bodies
that causes them to reject medical approaches more often than
other women do. Consistent with this analysis, Susan Irwin and
Brigitte Jordan have noted that women who are subjected to
court-ordered C-sections, by virtue of being outsiders, "lack the
'appropriate' ideological indoctrination. They have not been subject
to a sufficient degree to the symbolic coercion that .obviates physical force." 3" I would hypothesize that this lack of assimilation
into the medical model of childbirth not only suggests that outsider women are more likely to resist medical interventions in their
pregnancies, but also that they are more likely to be defined as
bad mothers by medical practitioners when they do. Because their
preferences are not articulated in the discourse of science and
rational cost-benefit maximizing, their conclusions are more likely
to be seen as illegitimate.
Of course, this alternative view of reproduction that some
outsider women hold is not perceived as evidence that the current
favor in which medicine is held derives from the greater social
power it enjoys or that midwifery is maligned because it lost out
in a power struggle with "scientific" approaches. The hegemony of
medicine is so complete that, to many, the statements quoted
above probably seem either woefully ignorant or defeatedly fatalistic. The "knowledge" that they reveal is not seen as the vestiges

324. Id.
325. Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 327.
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of a historical struggle in which common women lost control of

birthing to elite men, but rather as proof of their own inadequacy
Disparaged as mere "beliefs,"
as possessors of knowledge.'
these women's rejections of medical intervention in birth are seen
not as acts of resistance in a historical struggle but instead as
individual abnormality and deviance. 7 Science has become so
dominant that any challenge to it as a worldview is easily dismissed merely on the ground that it is non-science.
2. Connection and Oppression.
African-American women,
by not belonging, emphasize the significance of belonging. 3
Despite the airtight nature of medicine's self-validating system,
however, I do believe that there is a way for"more fundamental
resistance to occur. Thus, I will argue here that only when outsider
and privileged women understand the connections between their
situations-that is, when we develop an appreciation of the mutually reinforcing nature of class, race, and gender hierarchies-will
we be able to effectively challenge the hegemonic power of medical (and legal) discourse.
The mutually reinforcing nature of these systems is evident in
the operation of the dualisms that animate medical and legal treatment of birthing women. The contrasting images of outsider and
privileged women established by those dualisms enmesh each side
in the definition and condition of the other. That is, the reason
that outsider women are seen as bad girls is that privileged women
326. I should perhaps make it explicit that I do not mean to be taking a position
about whether it is advisable for some or all women of this or that age to undergo
amniocentesis. Nor am I attempting to reach any conclusion about whether the particular
women quoted above made wise decisions about the procedure. In fact, one might conclude from my analysis thus far that the "wisdom" of a particular decision is difficult if
not impossible to assess. My only point is that the manner in which these women analyzed their decisions suggests an affinity between their approaches and those of many
alternative birthing practitioners, both past and present.
327. As Irwin and Jordan have noted,
Cesarean sections are so much a part of the standard, legitimized form of
birthing that refusing to submit to one marks a woman as rejecting legitimate
medical advice. She is likely to be seen as idiosyncratically deficient, individually
culpable, maybe even a tragic case. She will not be seen as the victim of the
structural distribution of power and authority, as someone resisting the symbolic
violence of the transaction.
Irwin & Jordan, supra note 9, at 328.
328. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 68.
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are seen as good girls. The norms of white womanhood are the
norms that women of color are seen as having violated, and it is
the alleged violation of those norms that makes women of color
appear to be deviant. 329 If it were apparent that high-income
white women did not themselves live up to prevailing behavioral
standards, then the validity of those standards (as well as the
elevated status that such women enjoy) would be called into question. Thus, perceived 331 white female compliance with the reigning ideology is essential to the maintenance of that ideology. Similarly, just as privileged women's goodness is what defines outsider
women as bad, so outsider women's badness is what defines privileged women as good. As African-American theorist Patricia Hill
Collins has put it, "The status of African-American women as
outsiders or strangers becomes the point from which other groups
define their normality.""33
The fact that the two groups of women are defined in contrast
to each other in this way is replicated in their differential treatment. The dualisms legitimate both the increasing use of coercive
interventions against outsider women and the relatively infrequent
use of such interventions against privileged women. This differential treatment in turn reinforces the dualisms. Though unmistakable, this pattern of interrelated reinforcements is both complicated and subtle. On the one hand, coercive interventions in the reproductive and sexual behavior of low-income white women and
women of color will seem justified only if that behavior seems
deviant, and it will seem deviant only in contrast to behavior that
does not. On the other hand, privileged women will seem to be
conforming to norms, and their behavior will seem both uncoorced
and undeserving of coercion, only if contrasted with the (supposedly) deserved coercion of outsider women. For this reason, intervention in the lives of outsider women actually protects privileged
women from open coercion, by legitimating the latter's status as
good girls and confirming the former's status as bad.332 Coercive
329. Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 155-56.
330. Less important than whether such women actually comply is the perception that
they do.
331. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 68 ("As the 'Others' of society who can never really
belong, strangers threaten the moral and social order. But they are simultaneously essential for its survival because those individuals who stand at the margins of society clarify
its boundaries. African-American women, by not belonging, emphasize the significance of
belonging.").
332. In short, coercive interventions directed at women of color reinforce stereotypes
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intervention in the behavior of privileged women is therefore unlikely to occur with any frequency under this system, for such
intervention would call into question the fundamental categories
that justify the use of coercion.
At one level these sets of associations thus help privileged
women, protecting them from the same treatment outsider women
receive. However, the dualisms also hurt privileged women, for by
representing their situation to them as free of coercion, the prevailing ideology obscures the more subtle operation of power in
their lives. By telling them that they are free, it disables them
from identifying as oppressive the paternalistic, objectifying, and at
times unsafe treatment of the type that my friend Jessica Norton
so willingly accepted in her relationship with her physician.
Moreover, to the extent that privileged women are aware of
coercive interventions directed at outsider women, those interventions are indirectly coercive of privileged women as well. The
coercion of poor white women and women of color not only reinforces the image of upper-class white female purity (often harmful
in its own right) but also encourages actual compliance by privileged women with behavioral strictures modelled on that image.
Just as many women in society know that the courts are unlikely
to find that a woman has been raped if she was drinking heavily
or wore revealing clothes, so women are becoming aware that
medical and legal authorities will not hear a woman's objections to
coercive interventions in her pregnancy if she acts "irresponsibly,"
contests medical authority, or seems unwilling to sacrifice her own
well-being to that of her fetus.333

of white women by affirming (through the implicit contrast) that white women are not all
those things that women who suffer such interventions are. The same could be said for
low-income versus high-income women.
Thus, the relatively infrequent subjection of privileged women to coercive interventions in their reproductive lives reinforces the good girllbad girl dichotomy in two ways:
it both reinforces the notion that those different from them are bad and underlines the
fact that interventions only happen to bad women.
333. Interestingly, one of the reasons that outsider women are subjected to coercion
might be that they are simply unaware of the behavioral dictates compliance with which
would avoid such coercion. Medical anthropologists Irwin and Jordan suggest, for instance, that prenatal care and informational readings serve a socializing function for privileged women, teaching them what kinds of treatment to expect and what decisions are
for them, rather than for the doctor, to make. See Irwin & Johnson, supra note 9, at
327. People who refuse Cesareans, they suggest, might simply be people who "have not
had proper exposure to the 'correct' (dominant) way of thinking." Id.
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As Anna Tsing notes in discussing the wide variety of women
in her study who were defined as bad mothers, "[w]hat brings
them together is their cultural opposition as 'unnatural' alternatives
to more appropriate forms of womanhood and maternity. By setting a 'bad example,' these women, in all their diversity, direct
those who hear their stories toward the singular path of propriety.' '3' Privileged white women are reminded of the norms that
apply to them, and are encouraged to comply with those norms,
by seeing violations by bad women be punished. Thus, if they
accept the badness of such women, they are inexorably led to conclude that altering their behavior will protect them from coercion.
If they want to believe that they can control how they are treated,
they will necessarily have to conclude that coerced women deserve
their coercion. This conclusion is necessary because only by accepting the prevailing ideology's message that outsider women are bad
can privileged women conclude that the way one is treated is determined by one's behavior-rather than, for example, by one's
economic class or skin color. Only when women of color are defined as deviant are white women determined to be good. 35
What I am suggesting, then, is that the answer to the question
of how resistance occurs lies not only in our ability to expose each
group's subjugated status to itself, but more importantly in our
ability to awaken each group to the oppressed condition of others.336 It is the inability of subordinated groups-in this case,

334. Tsing, supra note 13, at 296. As Patricia Hill Collins has noted,
[The forced prostitution of enslaved African women] allowed white women to
be the opposite; Black "whores" make white "virgins" possible. This race/gender
nexus fostered a situation whereby white men could then differentiate between
the sexualized woman-as-body who is dominated and "screwed" and the asexual
woman-as-pure-spirit who is idealized and brought home to mother. The sexually denigrated woman, whether she was made a victim through her rape or a
pet through her seduction, could be used as the yardstick against which the cult
of true womanhood was measured. Moreover, this entire situation was profitable.

COLLINS, supra note 20, at 175-76 (citation omitted).
335. This interlocking set of assumptions also reinforces the individualism inherent in
Western ideology because in suggesting that a woman can actually control how she is
treated it makes her-rather than social stratification or systemic bias-seem to be responsible for her treatment. The status of bad women is seen as earned, rather than
ascribed.

336. In this respect, I approach the question of hegemony and resistance from a
slightly different perspective than other theorists. For example, one question that has
been debated in recent years is whether hegemonic discourses operate on the groups
whose oppression they justify or only on the oppressors themselves. Those who say that
the subjugated are equally mystified account for resistance by suggesting that occasional
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privileged and outsider women-to recognize the interconnectedness of their subordination that prevents them from acting together to overcome it. Subordination is effected (at least in this society) through a complex and interlocking web of relationships that
create cross-cutting fault lines of power and perspective. Although
sustained pressure exerted on any one fault line might cause a
major cataclysm, smaller amounts of pressure exerted simultaneously on many different fault lines merely cancel themselves out,
shoring up the system they aim to topple.
Thus, in the reproductive context, the failure of privileged
women and outsider women to recognize the interlocking nature
of their conditions prevents them from jointly attacking the overuse of Cesarean sections, whether consented or coerced. Privileged
women fail to perceive court-ordered surgeries as instances of race
and class discrimination and therefore all too easily accept the
medicolegal picture of them as instances of the necessary coercion
of irresponsible mothers. Such women not only tend to see such
interventions as deserved but also fail to appreciate that their own
freedom from medical coercion is a reflection of their race and
class privilege, rather than a confirmation of their responsible
mothering. Moreover, their inability to question the legitimacy of
medical conclusions about outsider women disables them from
recognizing the power operating within their own relationships
with physicians. Concomitantly, it may also be that the understandable resentment that women of color feel about the class privilege
of affluent women causes them to trivialize the harm done to
those women by the more subtle coercions inherent in the paternalistic model under which they are required to birth their children. What outsider women fail to realize, however, is that the
invisibility of medical exertions of power against privileged women
contributes to the legitimacy of legal exertions of power against

contradictions in the hegemonic system provide gaps through which the subjugated can
see the reality of the system, prompting them to resist. See, e.g., COMAROFF &
COMAROFF, supra note 301, at 19-27. This explanation is somewhat patronizing because
it suggests that an academic outsider can perceive oppression better than those who suffer it. Those who say that only the powerful are fooled by hegemonic discourses, see,
e.g., Scowr, supra note 301, at 317, avoid that problem, but they have a hard time explaining why the oppressed do not simply rise up in popular revolts and overthrow their
oppressors.
In contrast to both of these approaches, I explain resistance by complicating the
question of who is the subjugated class.
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themselves. In short, the two groups' situations are interlocking,
their fates linked.
What this analysis suggests about resistance to hegemonic
power (at least in this society) is that it is the interlocking nature
of race, class, and gender hierarchies that allows the prevailing
system to sustain itself despite acts of resistance. Because of the
overlaps among and interrelatedness of those hierarchies, some
aspects of the dominant system are clearly apparent to certain
dominated groups but invisible to others, whereas other aspects
are invisible to some and obvious to others. Like the mystical
island realm of Avalon in the tale of King Arthur, 37 the reality
of power, and the reality that power creates, are always appearing
and disappearing from view and are never seen clearly by everyone. It is thus each group's inability to appreciate the other's
condition that prevents privileged women from recognizing their
oppression and outsider women from escaping theirs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The analysis that I have presented here suggests a multiple
and fluid conception of power. It suggests that power resides not
only in the expert's authority to construct reality but also in the
complex interactions between groups affected by that reality. Thus,
for example, to say that the privileged situation of high-income
white women protects them from coercive interventions in their
pregnancies is to capture only part of the picture. This statement
conceives of power as always travelling unidirectionally, from the
dominant group onto the subordinated, rather than as ebbing and
flowing in complicated patterns between different groups. The assertion often made by intersectionality theorists that privileged
women are benefitted by their class and race status even if they
are disadvantaged by their gender, while not inaccurate, ignores
the extent to which the system of interlocking gender, race, and
class hierarchies simultaneously protects privileged women from
one type of power and exposes them to another. At the same time
that privileged women are protected from physical coercion, the

337. See MARION Z. BRADLEY, THE MIsTs OF AVALON (1982) (retelling the tale of
King Arthur from the perspective of the women in the story). In that tale, the isle of
Avalon, which serves as the point of entry to a parallel universe, is originally visible to
all but becomes increasingly invisible as Christianity spreads and people's worldviews
become more narrow and limited.
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very existence of their privileged position simultaneously creates
the conditions for their subordination by the controlling discourses
of modem medicine. Similarly, just as low-income women of
color's location at the bottom of race, class, and gender hierarchies
exposes them to coercion, it is also by virtue of their marginal
positioning that they are the repositories of an alternative knowledge that may actually make them more resistant than privileged
women to assimilation into the dominant medicolegal view of
reproduction.
For these reasons, limiting one's analysis to a description of
the ways in which the oppression of one group of women assures
the other group's ease is both incomplete and ineffective. It is
necessary as well to ask how the two groups' situations are mutually reinforcing-how each one's oppression sustains the other's.
Only by seeing these subtly supportive interconnections between
white supremacy, capitalism, and patriarchy can we hope to frame
the critiques and forge the coalitions with which to overcome
them.

